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conflicts which manifest no such characteristics.
The paper proposes a two-fold conceptual strategy for mediation based upon the extent to which a given conflict has
escalated, and the level to which its internal force structure has fragmented toward incoherence. The proactive strategy
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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that modern intra-state communal warfare exhibits several unique
qualities that distinguish such conflicts, significantly, from the wars in America's historical
experience. It demonstrates that identifying the social constructions of reality is a central
task for analysts seeking to comprehend the characteristics that define communal conflict.
It explains that the objectives for which communal conflicts are waged are often perceived
as indivisible, zero sum contests in the most absolute sense and thus differ, fundamentally,
from those upon which many inter-state wars of politics are predicated. It illustrates the
pernicious but seldom discussed effects of incoherent force structure which provide both
the catalyst to escalation and an unavoidable obstacle to negotiations. It concludes that
the state-based, implicitly coherent, "rational actor" paradigm for international relations is
simply inadequate for the task of analyzing and describing communal conflicts which
manifest no such characteristics.
The paper proposes a two-fold conceptual strategy for mediation based upon the
extent to which a given conflict has escalated, and the level to which its internal force
structure has fragmented toward incoherence. The proactive strategy addresses conflicts
at an early stage and applies a sociological approach to disarm misperceptions and
deconstruct conflict. The reactive strategy requires a forcibly imposed cease-fire followed
by extensive sociological, economic, and psychological approaches toward undoing
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This paper is intended to help United States policy makers identify and respond to
three important yet seldom discussed dynamics of violent communal conflict. It argues
that armed conflicts between communal groups, either within states or across state
boundaries, manifest certain characteristics that distinguish them, in significant ways, from
the major wars in America's political experience. The three key characteristics for analysis
are: (1) the major role which socially constructed reality plays in defining such conflicts;
(2) the perceived objectives for which communal conflicts are waged; and (3) the catalyst
of incoherent force and the effect of fragmented military structure on escalating such
conflicts toward total war. These characteristics, in combination, account for the
exceptional brutality and intractability of many communal conflagrations and help explain
the difficulty western mediators experience in proctoring resolutions of such conflicts.
United States officials devise foreign policy largely on the basis of a state-level ,
"rational actor" calculus. Policy makers regard international politics as a province of
governments who, like the United States, are "utility-maximizers" which conduct
themselves according to an instrumental calculus relating defined means to desired ends.
While this approach yielded a tidy framework for analysis under the tight bipolar
constraints of the cold war, it faces severe limitations in describing a world increasingly
characterized by state and national disintegration in which "world powers" play but
peripheral roles. For a number of sociological and structural reasons, the "rational
bargaining strategy" by which American policy makers approach conflict resolution, and
the Western concepts of "just" and "limited" war that underlie this strategy, are of limited
utility in generating effective policy responses to the unmitigated carnage endemic in
violent communal warfare.
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The three main characteristics of violent communal conflict previously mentioned--
socially constructed reality, perceived objectives, and incoherent force structure—are
treated as separate analytic lenses, each one specifically intended to illuminate a different
aspect of any given conflict.
The "social construction-lens" sheds light on the mechanisms by which individuals,
through both intra-group and inter-group social activity, create constructions of reality
that directly facilitate conflict between communal neighbors. This analysis reveals that, far
from being unavoidably compelled to violence by age-old, genetically programmed
legacies of visceral hatred, the participants in communal conflicts—wittingly or otherwise-
help create the very realities within which they find themselves embroiled. That is,
although they may well become victims as violence escalates, they are also participant
laborers in the production of their own miseries. Communal conflict is a man-made
structure which all adult members of society, to varying degrees of participation, help
build.
Perhaps the most difficult notion for American analysts to comprehend, is that
individual and group behavior is based largely on subjective constructions of reality. Yet
this realization reveals why many of the standard mechanisms of coercive diplomacy used
to mediate instrumental wars of politics simply do not work in influencing the course of
communal conflicts. As George Santayana once wrote, "There is nothing so helpless as
reason when faced with unreason." Violent communal conflicts are predicated upon
subjective constructions of reality that become objectified as essential truths to their
psychological adherents. Failure to recognize the existence of unique constructions of
reality on each side of a conflict may create a cognitive language barrier between
combatants and mediators that simply precludes effectual communication.
The "objective-lens" illustrates another major difference between the inter-group
violence of communal conflict and the political violence of interstate conflict. This
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analytic perspective demonstrates that inter-national communal conflicts, in contrast to
inter-state wars of politics, are often regarded as battles for the cultural or physical
survival of the competing groups. Analysts seeking to mediate a specific conflict should
ask certain very important questions to discern the essential character of the contest:
• What objectives are at stake?
• Are they limited, that is, governed by political calculations and consequently subject
to cost-benefit analyses and bargaining behavior?
• Are they divisible, that is, can they be divided—equitably or otherwise—between the
combatants?
• Or, as is frequently the case in communal warfare, is the objective in question
indivisible—zero sum competition in the most absolute sense—with "winner-take-all" as
the ultimate outcome?
• Finally, is the conflict perceived as a struggle for cultural or physical survival, an
objective which brooks neither cost-value calculation nor compromise?
Answers to these questions are invaluable in determining the basic complexion of
whichever conflict a mediator might face. They allow the analyst to differentiate between
non-zero sum games of politics and zero sum struggles for survival. The most important
lesson to recall when peering through the objective-lens is not how we—the outside world
—regard the objectives in communal conflict, but rather what they—the combatants within
it—perceive the stakes to be.
The "force structure-lens" provides the final analytic perspective to this paper's
analysis of communal conflict. Incoherent force structure is the essential precondition for
fragmented military and paramilitary violence which emerges quickly and builds rapidly in
communal conflagrations and, once present, changes fundamentally the complexion of the
conflict and the prognosis for resolution. Examination of this dynamic yields important
insight into the effects of random violence and crime on the already explosive environment
of communal conflict.
Policy makers gazing upon the global field of communal conflicts have essentially
two options in selecting strategies for mediation. The first applies to nascent conflicts
which have not yet exploded into full-scale communal warfare. The second applies to
more advanced conflagrations in which widespread inter-group violence already exists.
In nascent communal conflicts mediators must, proactively, seek to halt the
escalation toward zero sum communal competition and, simultaneously, derail the
fragmentation to an incoherent force structure. This option requires entree, incentives,
and a sociological strategy designed to disarm misperceptions and thereby deconstruct the
emerging reality of conflict. It may be accomplished with a minimum of force and a
surplus of diplomacy.
The second option deals with advanced communal conflicts manifesting incoherent
force structures and zero sum perceptions of reality, in which mediation is considerably
more difficult. In such cases, the field of independent "actors" must first be consolidated
by a combination of incentives and force. De facto peace having been imposed,
intervening forces may then turn to the structural and sociological strategies of organizing
government and reconstructing society. This latter option is essentially a process of
undoing feudalism, an approach similar in concept to those which successfully reunited the
feudal societies of Europe and Japan.
This thesis melds several diverse areas of research within its coherent "conceptual-
lens" perspective. The premise is that the dynamics of communal conflict can be
elucidated more effectively from a "macro," multi-disciplinary viewpoint than from several
"micro" perspectives viewed individually. From a better understanding of the dynamics
should flow better strategies for mediation.
The methodology used here adopts a unique, sociological approach to the analysis
and treatment of violent intra-state communal conflict. It endeavors to blend precepts of
sociology, psychology, ethnology, and conflict resolution theory into a cogent aid to assist
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in understanding and treating these complex inter-national disputes. It is, in great
measure, a sociological examination of the internal dynamics of communal warfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is intended to help United States policy makers identify, understand and
respond to three important yet seldom discussed dynamics of violent communal conflict. 1
It argues that armed conflicts between communal groups, either within states or across
state boundaries, manifest certain characteristics that distinguish them, in significant ways,
from the major wars in America's political experience. The three key characteristics for
analysis are: (1) the major role which socially constructed reality plays in defining such
conflicts; (2) the perceived objectives for which communal conflicts are waged; and (3)
the catalyst of incoherent force and the effect of fragmented military structure on
escalating such conflicts toward total war. These characteristics, in combination, account
for the exceptional brutality and intractability of many communal conflagrations and help
explain the difficulty western mediators experience in proctoring resolutions of such
conflicts.
A basic assumption of this paper is that American policy makers are intrinsically,
though not insurmountably, disadvantaged in grappling with issues of ethnic and religious
warfare. This is true not because the country is void of social strife, but rather because
such violence is anathematic to the broader conceptual "melting-pot" on which American
socialization is modeled. Americans, raised on ideals of representative democracy,
generally embrace the primacy of non-violent compromise in resolving social conflict.
Through the continual, rational bargaining process of America's political system, social
LThe term "communal" is used here to connote inter-group conflicts arising between social
groups that reside within a shared geographic region. The perceived "root of conflict"
(i.e. ethnicity, religion, et al.) is not of paramount importance to this definition. What is
required is for an "us" versus "them" dichotomy to have been constructed between parties
in a finite geographic region, or homeland, for communal conflict to arise. Thus, the term
"communal" will describe a variety of identity based conflicts be they ethnic, religious,
sub-ethnic, a combination of each, or even, in some cases, political in origin.
cleavages are gradually but inexorably abraded, thereby drawing nearer the ideal of strong
state socialization beneath which national identities may coexist peacefully. 2 This author
contends, however, that the precepts governing America's social policies at home often
form inappropriate foreign policy paradigms for dealing with conflicts whose participants—
for a variety of reasons—do not, or cannot, share a similar construct of reality.
United States officials devise foreign policy largely on the basis of a state-level ,
"rational actor" calculus. Policy makers regard international politics as a province of
governments who, like the United States, are "utility-maximizers" which conduct
themselves according to an instrumental calculus relating defined means to desired ends. 3
While this approach yielded a tidy framework for analysis under the tight bipolar
constraints of the cold war, it faces severe limitations in describing a world increasingly
characterized by state and national disintegration in which "world powers" play but
peripheral roles.
throughout this paper, the term nation will refer to the essentially psychological bond
which, as Walker Connor eloquently describes, "joins a people and differentiates it, in the
subconscious conviction of its members, from all other people in a most vital way." See
Walker Connor, "A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a ...," Ethnic and
Racial Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1978): 379. This usage contrasts with the
common—albeit mistaken—usage of nation as a synonym for state, a term that properly
denotes a particular political subdivision of the globe.
3This paper assumes that the "rational actor" model of international relations—interstate
conflict as means-ends activity—has long provided the theoretic framework for American
foreign policy. This assumption is based on a wide body of literature supporting this
position. For sympathetic views see Russel Weigley, The American Way of War
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973); Larry Cable, Conflict of Myths (New York:
New York Univ. Press, 1986); Carl Builder, The Masks of War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press, 1989); Andrew F. Krepenevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986); Dennis Drew and Donald Snow, Making Strategy (Maxwell
AFB, Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1988). For specific discussions of the rational
actor/utility maximizer paradigm see Graham Allison, Essence ofDecision (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1971), and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press, 1981).
Therefore, a second objective of this paper will be to illustrate some significant flaws
inherent within the dominant paradigms that currently guide U.S. foreign policy. For a
number of sociological and structural reasons, the "rational bargaining strategy" by which
the United States approaches conflict resolution, and the Western concepts of "just" and
"limited" war that underlie this strategy, are of limited utility in generating effective policy
responses to the unmitigated carnage endemic of violent communal warfare. Two purely
conceptual alternative strategies will be discussed by which either to: (1) preempt the
escalation of violence in increasingly divided societies, or (2) undo the feudal structure of
inter-clan warfare which often arises in tandem with the widespread outbreak of
communal violence, and undo the sinister side-effects that accompany it.
A. METHODOLOGY
This thesis melds several diverse areas of research into a coherent "conceptual-lens"
perspective. The premise is that the dynamics of communal conflict can be elucidated
more effectively from a "macro," multi-disciplinary viewpoint than from several "micro"
perspectives viewed individually. From a better understanding of the dynamics should
flow better strategies for mediation.
The methodology used here adopts a unique, sociological approach to the analysis
and treatment of violent intra-state communal conflict. It endeavors to blend precepts of
sociology, psychology, ethnology, and conflict resolution theory into a cogent aid to assist
in understanding and treating these complex mttv-national disputes. 4 It is, in great
measure, a sociological examination of the internal dynamics of communal warfare.
•Additionally, the paper's analytic framework endeavors to address a number of specific
areas for useful research suggested by U.S. officials during interviews conducted at the
Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and Department of Defense during
December 1993, Washington, D.C.
The three main characteristics of violent communal conflict previously mentioned—
socially constructed reality, perceived objectives, and incoherent force structure--will be
treated as separate analytic lenses, each one specifically intended to illuminate a different
aspect of any given conflict.
Chapter II illustrates, first, the mechanisms of individual and group socialization by
which a society's key beliefs are formed and altered; and, second, the vital role which the
social constructions of reality play in defining the essential course and character of every
violent communal conflict.
Chapter III reveals a key difference between the inter-group violence of communal
conflict and the political violence of interstate conflict: the essential objectives over which
these wars are waged. The discussion will show that inter-national communal conflicts, in
contrast to inter-state political warfare, are often regarded as battles for the cultural or
physical survival of the combatants.
Chapter IV analyzes the unique escalation dynamic of incoherent force structure
and illustrates the effects of random violence and crime on the already explosive
environment of communal conflict.
Finally, Chapter V discusses some of the blatant limitations of America's dominant
paradigm for conflict analysis—the "Rational Actor" model—and reviews the various policy
implications that flow from the preceding sociological analysis of violent communal
warfare.
H. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION-LENS
This chapter establishes the central conceptual framework around which the
subsequent chapters of this thesis will revolve. It lays the groundwork for a sociological
exploration of the social constructions of reality, and offers an introduction to the myriad
ways in which such constructions create and circumscribe communal conflict. Such
analysis is essential not only to understanding the whys and hows of identity based
conflicts, but also to recognizing opportunities and limitations for those standing outside a
conflict, looking in.
The "social construction-lens" sheds light on the mechanisms by which individuals,
through both intra-group and inter-group social activity, create constructions of reality
that directly facilitate conflict between communal neighbors. This analysis reveals that, far
from being unavoidably compelled to violence by age-old, genetically programmed
legacies of visceral hatred, the participants in communal conflicts—wittingly or otherwise-
help create the very realities within which they find themselves embroiled. That is,
although they may well become victims as violence escalates, they are also participant
laborers in the production of their own miseries. Communal conflict is a man-made
construction which all adult members of society, to varying degrees of participation, help
build.
A. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS
Perhaps because the nature of social construction theory is somewhat abstract, it is
seldom discussed as a tool for analysts and policy makers attempting to forge policy
responses to the world's conflicts. This is unfortunate, for the "construction-lens" yields
valuable insights not only on the motives of the specific national and sub-national "actors"
in question, but also into the basic assumptions upon which U.S. policy is itself predicated.
1. Social Construction: American Style
To illustrate the utility of a sociological approach to policy analysis, it is
instructive to briefly examine one of the key assumptions upon which American policies
are based. This approach is not intended as a critique of U.S. policy, but rather as an
illustration of a common socially constructed fact in action. The construction-lens reveals
that some of the core tenets of U.S. diplomacy, taken for granted asfacts by the American
public, are somewhat less solid than might be expected. By examining the notion of
America's "national interest," we gain insight into the ways in which constructed realities
come to effect policy.
It is a commonsense notion that America's political leadership pursues
instrumental foreign policy options perceived to be in support of the "national interest."
However, exactly what this nebulous phrase connotes is in no way clear—either to elected
politicians or to the constituents they serve. Apart from vague but generally acceptable
definitions such as "those things that benefit America's economy and safeguard her
national security," one would have little luck in reaching broad consensus on what
specifically comprises the "national interest." 5
In his classic work elucidating the "Rational Actor" model of international
relations (war as an expected-utility problem), Bruce Bueno de Mesquita reveals the
5This topic provides the substance of an excellent, highly provocative course (NS 4200)
entitled "Seminar in the National Interest," given by Professor Frank Teti of the National
Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. The eleven-
week course examines the epistemologicai foundations—predicated upon Americans' social
constructions of reality—upon which any meaningful conception of the "national interest"
rests. Among the most valuable lessons of this course is that the national interest is, in
fact, an intangible, highly subjective psychological construction that exists as reality only
so long as Americans collectively believe that it exists. Moreover, it is a notion which is
seldom defined in exactly the same way by different people. That is, as individual
Americans differ, so do their conceptions of the national interest. No two versions are
exactly alike.
virtual impossibility of ascertaining, or acting on the basis of the national interest in a
pluralistic society:
We may identify national policies, but there is no reason to expect those policies to be
related to "the will of the people" or to "the public good" when they result from
collectively made decisions. Decision-making rules, from unanimity to dictatorship,
may permit the advice of any number of people to influence public policy, but once
consent is required from more than one and fewer than all, the danger is great that
decisions on controversial questions will be unrepresentative of anyone's interest.
Once decision making is bureaucratized, the quest for acceptable compromises
increases the likelihood that there will be little or no congruence between national
policies and the individual intentions or purposes in that society, offering even less
reason to believe that there is anything resembling the national interest. 6 (Emphasis
added.)
Bueno de Mesquita thus postulates that the results of any given collectively made decision
may represent the desires of a minority, a single individual, or no one at all. He accepts
the conclusion of "Arrow's Paradox"~a hypothesis offered by Nobel Prize-winning
economist Kenneth Arrow—that many social choices may, indeed, represent the interests
of no one or of anyone. 7 Explained this way, it seems almost incomprehensible that
America's elected representatives could be successful in identifying and acting consistently
in accordance with the national interest of the country as, incidentally, most purport to
do.
This apparent conundrum has significant implications for those charged with
formulating U.S. foreign policy. How, for instance, can policies ostensibly rooted in
America's "national interest" be formulated when no clear identification of such a concept
exists? There is no single answer to this question. Policy makers walk on a platform of
broadly constructed political and social realities. This platform provides latitudinal
boundaries within which specific issues are determined by democratic consensus.
6See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1981): 12-
13.
7Ibid., 13.
While a detailed analysis of America's interests is far beyond the scope and
subject of this paper, the aforementioned—albeit unanswered—question illustrates that
some of the notions which Americans subconsciously take for granted as "fact," are in
reality, not facts at all. Rather they are broadly associated concepts which, through the
reciprocal process of social construction, become reinforced as truth in the minds of most
citizens. Commonsense truths and everydayfacts become inseparable as reality. Citizens,
acting in concert at the ballot box, transfer such "truths" to the minds of elected officials
who, in turn, formulate policies based upon "facts" which—as we recall—are not,
objectively, facts at all. They are merely constructions of reality that satisfy most of the
needs of American society.
Ask most Americans if it is in the "national interest" to save starving people
and they will answer in the affirmative. Ask which interests? and one receives, as often as
not, shrugs of uncertainty. This paradox is of enormous importance to the country's
political leadership. It is incumbent upon policy makers, and the analysts who advise
them, to continually reevaluate the "taken for granted assumptions" (e.g. constructions of
reality) upon which American foreign policies are founded. 8
8In their path-breaking book on the sociology of knowledge entitled, The Social
Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday, 1966), Peter L. Berger and Thomas
Luckmann argue that a socially constructed concept undergoes the transformation to fact
when society collectively ceases to examine its verity on a continual basis but rather "takes
for granted" the concept as an objective truth. Berger and Luckmann write, "The reality
of everyday life is taken for granted as reality. It does not require additional verification
over and beyond its simple presence. It is simply there, as self-evident and compelling
facticity. I know that it is real." (23.) This is not to argue that the world is void of
objective facts (i.e. starvation, tidal waves, et al.). Starvation and tidal waves, for
instance, exist whether or not humans in society collectively acknowledge them as such.
Social construction of fact occurs in the interpretation of such physical realities. The fact
that starvation is tragic, or that tidal waves arefearsome, is where the socially constructed
reality may be found.
Moving back to the utility of a social construction perspective in analysis and
mediation of communal conflict, one now sees that the conceptual "lens" may be peered
through from either direction. It may be used either to examine the motives of combatants
within a specific conflict, or to scrutinize the assumptions underlying American policy
initiatives designed to effect that conflict.
In the area of communal conflict mediation, U.S. doctrine is clearly in the
developmental stage; that is, the constructed reality of America-As-Mediator in such
conflicts is not yet complete. Standard operating procedures (SOP) do not yet exist to
provide well-tested guidance to the Clinton Administration on such matters. Hence, Ross
Perot's rueful characterization of the administration—with respect to Bosnia—as "flying
blind without instruments," is, in some ways, accurate. 9 The policy construction process is
presently underway, however, and each "success" or "failure" reveals yet another missing
piece ofthe horizon to help the pilot chart a more coherent course.
Two final insights for analysis are provided by utilizing the social construction
perspective. First, it reveals that the constructions of reality which define the character of
communal conflicts are inherently dynamic; that is, perceptions of "present reality" change
substantially as a function of time and circumstance. The process facilitating such change
will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
Second, the "construction-lens" reveals that fundamentally different—indeed
reciprocal—perceptions of reality may exist simultaneously between the respective parties
in conflict, as well as between mediators attempting to forge lasting peace. As Berger and
Luckmann explain, such differences in perceived "realities"—although commonly ignored
in everyday life—should be of great interest both to the sociologist and to the analyst of
communal conflict:
9See Howard Fineman, "Perot: Rattling the White House," Newsweek 10 May 1993: 34.
One could say that the sociological understanding of "reality" and "knowledge" falls
somewhere in the middle between that of the man in the street and that of the
philosopher. The man in the street does not ordinarily trouble himself about what is
"real" to him and about what he "knows" unless he is stopped short by some sort of
problem. He takes his "reality" and his "knowledge" for granted. The sociologist
[like the conflict analyst] cannot do this, if only because of his systematic awareness
of the fact that men in the street take quite different "realities" for granted as between
one society and another. The sociologist is forced by the very logic of his discipline
to ask, if nothing else, whether the difference between the two "realities" may not be
understood in relation to various differences between the two societies. 10
Because one's perception of the objectives in conflict plays the defining role in articulating
strategy and dictating tactics, discrepant perceptions portend equally discrepant patterns
of behavior and motivations for action. Mediators should attempt to ascertain such
differences and adapt approaches accordingly.
B. INTRODUCTION TO A PERSPECTIVE"
Unlike many other sociological theories attempting to explain human behavior, the
social construction perspective argues that individuals are functional actors in shaping
their own realities. 12 Rather than accepting the argument that individual behavior is
merely a response to larger social forces, social constructionists assert that each individual
human plays a significant role in creating and influencing reality as it is perceived by his
immediate social group. The collective perceptions of that group, in turn, influence the
broader interpretations of reality at the societal level, and so on. Hence, at the lowest
10Berger and Luckmann, 2.
nMuch of this section is based directly upon the framework provided by Dana P. Eyre,
David R. Segal, and Mady Wechsler Segal in "The Social Construction of Peacekeeping,"
in Segal and Segal, Peacekeepers And Their Wives (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993):
42-55.
12Eyre, et al., provide a concise overview of the functionalist and conflict perspectives,
two alternative views of human behavior, citing the basic precepts of each as well as the
significant protagonists of both views. See ibid., 44.
10
level of analysis, individuals matter in what is, or is not, perceived as reality. As Eyre, et
al., write:
The label social constructionism, although awkward, thus emphasizes a central insight
into the basic nature of society. Human beings are not merely acted on by
disembodied social facts or distant social forces, but rather are actors, constantly
shaping and creating their own worlds in and through interaction with other
individuals. 13
This concept of the individual's role in shaping (e.g. constructing) reality will become
particularly significant later, when this paper turns to the mechanisms by which mediators
may hope to deconstruct or remodel existing realities and thereby undo violent communal
conflicts.
Although the social construction perspective focuses on individual action, it does
not ignore the power of society in shaping behavior. To the contrary, it places enormous
importance on the reciprocal reinforcement dynamic between the individual and other
members within his group, and within broader society in general. To proceed upward in
one's level of analysis, however, it is essential to identify and clearly recognize the seminal
function of the individual in shaping society's most basic conceptions of reality. As Eyre,
et al., explain, "Families, classes, ethnic groups, businesses, churches, armies, and even
nations are, at their roots, human creations that do not exist independently of individual
social behavior. We create these collectivities and the rules we live by, and we daily
recreate them through our behavior. That these collectivities, once created, in turn shape
our lives does not reduce the reality of their constructed nature." 14 Hence any
investigation into the nature of group perceptions and collective behavior should begin by




Another valuable insight yielded by the social construction perspective is a thorough
debunking of genetic or biological sociology. That is, explanations of human behavior as
preprogrammed by genetics become transparent when viewed through the social
construction-lens. For example, the behavior and character of an infant removed from his
"warrior tribe" at birth and raised by a pair of Oxford professors will, as an adult, far more
closely resemble Winston Churchill than Shaka Zulu. This basic "socialization" argument
is hardly controversial, and yet one regularly reads careless references, for instance, to the
"warrior blood" of the Balkan Slavs as justification for the ongoing carnage in Bosnia. 13
Indeed, despite the taken-for-granted validity of socialization as the leading factor in
human behavior, substantial portions of the public and of the government body, writ large,
seem to prefer regarding atavistic behavior as a genetic product of specific races. Such ill-
considered arguments are revealed as hollow when individual beliefs are analyzed and their
sources traced immediately to social interaction with others.
Human behavior is shaped primarily by the meanings and beliefs that individuals use
to understand a situation. The compulsion to "make sense" of one's world is, perhaps,
intrinsic to human nature. In that sense, human actions are essentially a series of ongoing
stimulus-response activities in which individuals formulate beliefs as a way of ordering and
understanding their surroundings. Such beliefs give meaning to life's everyday activities
and, over time, become codified as reality.
Yet, despite the routinized nature of the reality construction process, it is clear that
meaning and belief are not static throughout life but, to the contrary, are ever-changing.
Rather than assuming fixed—ergo unchangeable—configurations, meanings and beliefs are
dynamic; that is, they are continually reconstructed through ongoing interactions with
15But one of innumerable examples of this point is found in Robert D. Kaplan's colorfully
written but historically and analytically careless work entitled Balkan Ghosts (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1993).
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one's environment. This concept--^ malleability of belief—is enormously important in
revealing opportunities for a sociological approach to conflict mediation. 16
If one accepts the hypothesis that individual behavior is predicated upon meaning
and belief, then it follows that coordinated action at the group level is only possible
because of shared meaning between its members. Thus, to understand a particular
individual's or group's behavior, much less to have any hope of modifying such behavior,
we must approach the situation from the standpoint of the actors within it.
Eyre, et al., argue that to comprehend the conduct of any group in a given situation,
the analyst must "develop an understanding of the 'commonsense meanings'—the internal
experiences—carried by the actors involved in [that particular] situation." As a helpful
conceptual tool for accomplishing this task, they suggest that the sociologist assume an
"analytical assumption of meaninglessness." 17 Such an assumption essentially views the
world as objectively devoid of meaning. Hence, only through a process of individual and
mutual interaction do humans assign meaning to their daily routines and surroundings.
This analytic assumption ofmeaninglessness is of great assistance to the sociologist
endeavoring to understand and explain the motives to group behavior. It simplifies the
analyst's task by focusing his attention directly on the processes through which a group's
commonsense shared meanings—the foundation upon which all coordinated social action
depends—are constructed and maintained. Analysis at this level yields what may be the
central insight offered by the social construction perspective: that meaning and belief—
hence, reality—is constructed reciprocally. Eyre, et al., illuminate this reciprocal
relationship by discussing one of the basic dynamics of American etiquette:
16This is not to imply that belief systems are entirely malleable and easy to change, but
rather that individual beliefs are relatively more malleable than might be consciously
acknowledged.
17Eyre, et al., 45.
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To illustrate [the reciprocal construction dynamic] at a basic level, rules defining
whether one should rest one's hands on the dinner table or in the lap while not eating
during a meal have meaning (they symbolize refinement or the lack thereof), not
because of the inherent nature of either option, but because of a common constructed
interpretation of the act. Our understandings are shaped at an early age. Our
behavior reproduces those understandings, and in turn, it shapes the behavior of
others...Arguments of social constructionism therefore, have the advantage of
directing our attention toward both the way in which meaning guides behavior, and
the process through which meaning is constructed. 18 (Emphasis added.)
The social construction perspective thus sheds light on the manner in which people
attempt to "make sense" of their universe, and the reciprocal effect which their findings
(manifest as meaning, knowledge, and beliefs) have on shaping individual and group
behavior.
This comprehension illustrates well the profound interaction between the communal
environment in which one lives and the essential meaning one's world assumes. The
seldom considered but oft cited maxim, "one is a product of one's environment," is thus
true to the extent that one's knowledge about the social world is, in many ways, a direct
product of that world. As Eyre, et al., summarize nicely, "Major parts of what we
experience as 'real' are, in fact, produced through social interaction. This includes our
sense of who we are: our sense of self" 19 Hence the analyst attempting to understand a
communal group's perceptions of reality and ascertain the grounding upon which its
actions are based must first be familiar with the basic mechanisms by which collective
meaning is acquired.
18Ibid., 45-6. The authors assert that the reciprocal relationship between individual and
group in the process of constructing and reinforcing meaning is the central insight of social
constructionism. They argue that, "...language, social institutions, and culture all have
common meaning because we, collectively, act as if they have common meaning." (45.)
19Ibid., 46.
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1. The Socialization Process
Although a comprehensive sociological discussion of the construction of
"human society" is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief introduction to some of the
basic aspects of the socialization process is useful to analysts employing the construction-
lens to better understand communal conflict. This process is, as discussed earlier, a
reciprocal activity whereby individuals' beliefs and behavior are effected by society even as
society is defined by the individual members within it. And while many of one's most basic
constructions of reality are established at an early age (primary socialization), the ongoing
process of redefining meaning occurs throughout life (secondary socialization), yielding
re-constructions of reality with no less power or significance than those borne of
childhood.20
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language
defines the verb to socialize as, "to make social; make fit for life in companionship with
others." 21 This concise definition adequately summarizes the ultimate objective of the
process of human socialization, a task assumed by communal groups of all regions, in
every country of the world. And yet, as discussed earlier, the process is not merely a one-
way activity of groups making individuals fitfor life in companionship with others. It is
also the forum in which individuals reciprocally participate in the creation of their own
realities, accepting some—which they reinforce by becoming part—and refusing others—
which they weaken by rejecting. Through this reciprocal socialization process individuals
20For an examination of the respective roles which primary and secondary socialization
play in internalizing reality, and a discussion of the various mechanisms by which each is
accomplished, see Berger and Luckmann, 129-147.
21 Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (New York:
Portland House, 1989): 1351.
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shape the characteristics of institutions and groups of which they become part, even as
they, themselves, are defined by those very groups and institutions.
While it is clear that socialization plays a key role in creating beliefs and
shaping reality, it is equally clear that the process is ongoing throughout one's life. That is,
while notions of primary versus secondary socialization are theoretically interesting, there
is little evidence to indicate that the lessons learned in childhood (i.e. keep hands off table;
respect one's elders; the Golden Rule; etc.) are any more powerful or enduring than those
adopted later in life (i.e. I am a military officer; avoid dark alleys at night; or, for neo-
Nazis, Jews are the scourge of the earth; etc.). Hence socialization is an ongoing process
in which the continual construction and reconstruction of belief and reality is an integral
part.
To summarize, socialization is a continual process whereby individuals make
sense of the social and physical worlds, and society makes sense of them. Members
construct meanings and assume social roles even as their beliefs and behavior are being
defined by the very roles which they adopt. Commonly held beliefs among group
members provide coherence: helping order realities, dictating everyday behavior, and
providing meaning in life's otherwise meaningless environment. The socialization process
thus influences the beliefs which define individual and group behavior, and continues from
cradle to grave.
C. REMODELING REALITY
As discussed earlier, widely held meanings and beliefs yield essential guidance for
the conduct of daily life, and provide substantive grist to the social constructions of reality.
Through simple routine, beliefs left unchallenged by developments in the physical or social
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world which they cannot explain may become objectified as social institutions over time. 22
Such institutions are, essentially, social patterns based on taken-for-granted facts, which
circumscribe appropriate behavior in everyday life. If, however, society becomes
confronted by a social or physical condition which the standing institutions fail to satisfy,
its members are compelled to develop a better understanding of the situation. This forces
a reevaluation of those taken-for-granted realities which have been found insufficient to
the task at hand. In such instances, the stage is set for a remodeling of existing
institutions; that is, for the reconstruction of reality.
The remodeling process occurs when the existing "recipes for social interaction" fail
to bring about a satisfactory resolution to a given social situation. 23 When faced with
new, uncertain or intimidating ambiguities in life, humans seek rationalization. This
rationalization process occurs first, by investigating the emergent puzzle; and, second, by
offering accounts and explanations which provide newly constructed meaning to help
understand the situation. Remodeling is an inherently social activity in which, through
mutual interaction, nascent concepts become reinforced as the "answers" to society's
emergent "questions." Eyre, et al., summarize the mechanisms by which this task is
regularly accomplished in one's daily life:
Through discussion, debate, and interaction, an emergent meaning is constructed in
problematic situations. We act in situations, develop them, and change them,
constantly constructing or reevaluating meaning for the emergent situation through
our interaction with others. These socially constructed meanings help coordinate
interactions, but they are volatile because the situations themselves change. As the
situation changes, meaning is reconstructed. 14, (Emphasis added.)
22For a far more detailed treatment of society as objective reality than is provided here, as
well as a discussion of the mechanisms by which social institutions are codified, see Berger
and Luckmann, 47-92.
23Eyre, et al., 49.
24Ibid.
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Understanding both the vehicles and implications of the remodeling process is essential for
analysts of communal conflict.
Indeed, it is the manipulation of this process—often by political elites attempting to
build constituent support—which leads to the rise of intergroup animosity. Via a number
of mechanisms, communal reality becomes reconstructed in the form of inter-group
hostility, thereby unleashing conflict where it may not have previously existed.
1. Belief System Alteration
As part of our further discussion of the reality remodeling process, it is
instructive to briefly examine the concept of belief system alteration. In his theoretical
treatise entitled, The Fixation ofBelief and Its Undoing, Issac Levi provides an excellent
introduction to some of the existing theories on belief alteration. 25 Levi argues that the
process of changing constructed beliefs occurs—and is justified by the participants—in one
of two essential ways. Cognitive change is effected either by (1) expansion, or (2)
contraction, of the existing inventory of beliefs. One does not—either at the individual or
group level—argues Levi, simply replace a system of beliefs outright. This notion should
be of significant interest to analysts of communal conflict, for it illustrates the incremental
nature of the reality remodeling process.
In the first of Levi's cognitive alteration mechanisms, the "expansion" option,
the existing inventory is altered by addition of new beliefs. Such beliefs become justified
for inclusion when they are widely found to provide satisfactory, consistent meaning to
emergent social puzzles. Once a substantial portion of the group's population accepts the
validity of such a concept, the previously discussed process of social construction begins
to codify its position within the existing structure of reality. The longer such an "answer"
25Issac Levi, The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1991).
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succeeds in rationalizing the previously problematic puzzle, the more deeply ingrained it
becomes in the belief system of both individual and group. A society's collective belief
system is thus expanded by the addition of new concepts which, over time, have proven
their worth by providing meaning to new, ever-emerging social realities.
Levi's second method for belief system alteration is the "contraction" option.
This occurs when the validity of a previously settled "assumption" becomes seriously
questioned by a significant portion of society. Members cease being certain of an
assumption either when its ability to satisfy a long-standing requirement falters, or when a
newly discovered concept—perhaps one added to the system through the expansion
process mentioned earlier—better satisfies the cognitive requirement, thereby marking the
assumption in question as obsolete.
Perhaps because of the discomfort humans encounter in the face of uncertainty,
there is an inherent reluctance to forsake erstwhile settled assumptions outright. This is
particularly true when no clearly superior, comprehensive alternative is available. The
natural preference is to simply continue to expand a belief system by addition.
Contractions are avoided so long as the increasingly antiquated assumptions in
question maintain even a modicum of relevance. The reluctance to eschew standing
convictions varies from person to person according circumstance, and thus accounts for
basic differences in perceived reality—even between members of the same group. This
realization helps to explain extant individuality within even the most rigidly structured
societies.
Generally speaking, it is far easier for the members of a society to accept new
beliefs (expand) than to erase old ones (contract). This helps explain the recalcitrance of
long-standing ethnic or religious stereotypes as justification for prejudice between social
groups in mixed communal societies. Despite emerging evidence of an "other" group's
social worth—even, in many cases, in spite of significant, tangible contributions to the
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universal betterment of society—competing group members may choose to maintain
preexisting prejudices within their individual belief systems.
a. The "Phantom Limb " Hypothesis
This concept is explained well in Lawrence Leshan's provocative investigation
into the psychological foundations of violent conflict entitled, The Psychology of War.
Leshan effectively illustrates this natural reluctance to alter one's belief system by
contraction through the medium of his "Phantom Limb" hypothesis of human psychology.
He argues that belief system maintenance occurs largely as a product of its own inertia. 26
That is, according to Leshan, people will continue to believe a notion that was once true
simply because it has not been absolutely proven to be untrue. This insight is useful in
illustrating the potential for latent beliefs, perhaps even those long dormant, to be
maintained within the collective psyche of a segment of society unless specifically proven
to be obsolete and consciously removed. This notion will be important in the discussion,
later in this chapter, of the role of history as a ready resource pool for the construction of
communal conflict.
The continued existence of significant racial stereotypes in the United States,
despite the long standing "melting pot" conception of American socialization, provides
one such example of the "Phantom Limb" hypothesis in action. Many elder, white
Americans—socialized with the belief of racial supremacy, an assumption codified as
reality by segregation and other such institutions—refuse to relinquish anachronistic
stereotypes regarding minority populations. This avoidance of belief system contraction is
significant because such beliefs may be transferred, at lest in part, to succeeding
26See Lawrence Leshan, The Psychology of War (Chicago: Noble Press, Inc., 1993): 10.
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generations of family members and thereby remain within the social constructions of
reality long after their problem-solving utility has gone.
The concepts of Levi and Leshan on belief system alteration are of enormous
significance to analysts of communal conflict. They reinforce the notion that the process
of constructing animosity between competing social groups is a gradual one, though
varying in speed and method according to circumstance. This realization suggests the
existence of a hypothetical window of opportunity for intervention during which the
process of belief system alteration—hence, the remodeling of reality—might be derailed,
and the looming conflict de-escalated with minimal bloodshed.
2. Shifting Realities
A second theoretical concept useful to understanding the reconstruction
process is the notion of fluctuating perspectives of reality. The act of shifting the
perspective from which one discerns one's immediate reality is a common occurrence in
daily life. The shift in reality experienced during a transition from consciousness to day
dream, provides one example. Becoming immersed in the plot of an action movie
provides another such example. The shift requires the viewer to assume a fundamentally
different perspective of reality from that which he occupied, for instance, during the drive
to the theater. This concept of short term shifts in perceived reality applies equally well at
both the group and, indeed, national levels as well.
Such "shifts" in perspective are significant in defining one's behavior in
everyday life. They involve undergoing a temporary transition from the dispassionate
reality bounding one's mundane daily tasks, to a more highly charged reality in response to
a newly perceived emergency of some kind. In such a scenario one's perspective of
reality—and, concomitantly, one's behavior—changes significantly, but temporarily, in
reaction to perceived changes or threats in the surrounding social environment.
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Again, Lawrence Leshan provides a useful framework for analysis of this
important psychological phenomenon. Leshan contrasts the conceptual perspectives of
everyday reality and special reality, which he terms sensory and mythic , respectively.
Sensory reality essentially reflects the reality of one's immediate physical world; that is, the
truly objective state of things as they might appear to a disinterested observer. The mythic
perspective, by contrast, reflects a social construction borne of passionate human
interaction. Mythic reality incorporates the prejudices, fears, and myths embodied in one's
social and historical resource pool which combine to form a different reality entirely from
that of the sensory perception. Individual and group behavior thus varies significantly
depending on which perspective of reality one assumes at any given time.
Leshan asserts that this shift occurs, in moderate degrees, as a regular feature
of daily life. Noted behaviorist Eric Ericson believed that only through keen awareness
and conscious psychological effort does man remain in either frame of reality for any
significant length of time. 27 Largely through reciprocal interaction with others, who
seldom share exactly the same perspective at the exactly the same time, individuals move
back and forth between sensory and mythic perspectives, generally without even noticing
the transition.
An exception to this pattern of socially imposed "sanity checks" occurs when
an emergency of some significance is perceived simultaneously, and regarded as
threatening by a significant sector of the populace. In such an instance, sensory reality
may be suspended simultaneously across a broad spectrum of effected society. This
creates a potentially dangerous situation in which an entire social group assumes a
universal perception of reality in the mythic perspective . According to Leshan, the most
common and comprehensive emergency eliciting such a response, is war.
27Cited in ibid., 40.
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The great danger posed by the mythic perception of reality at a group-wide
level is thus that the normal system of checks and balances between members becomes
deactivated. That is, critical thought becomes collectively suspended as the group "reacts"
rather than "thinks." This situation is problematic because, with all members of a group
interpreting reality from a similar, absolute perspective, it becomes virtually impossible to
extricate themselves from a rapidly escalating conflict. Leshan writes,
It is only in the sensory reality that one can learn from experience or from history. In
the mythic reality, the rules are so firmly set that little learning occurs. We follow our
concepts of "what is," rather than examine and learn from what is happening.28
Indeed, once a shift to mythic perspective comes to characterize a significant portion of
the group's psyche, escalation of hostilities becomes far easier. Hence Leshan's assertion
that, "All wars are brought about—and bring about—a shift from the sensory reality
evaluation system to that of the mythic reality."29 Within such a collective perspective, the
reciprocal reinforcement dynamic—an integral part of the social reconstruction of reality,
as discussed earlier—is far more rapidly and powerfully facilitated.
Contrasting the differing perceptions of reality in peacetime and wartime yields
a useful illustration of the dichotomous relationship between the sensory and mythic
perspectives. One of the key indicators of such a transition is the shift from limited or
varying interpretations of reality to absolute perspectives, etched in black and white.
Another indicator is the reorientation of the language people use to describe opposing
groups. In Table 1, Leshan elucidates some of prevalent perceptual differences between





1. Good and Evil have many shades
of gray. Many groups with different
ideas and opinions are legitimate.
Their opinions, and things in general,
are relatively good or bad, satisfactory
or unsatisfactory, stupid or intelligent.
2. Now is pretty much like other
times. There are more of some
things, less of others, but the
differences are quantitative.
3. The great forces of nature, such as
God or human evolution, are not
particularly involved in our disputes.
4. When this present period is over,
things will go on pretty much as they
have in the past.
Wartime
Good and Evil are reduced to Us and
Them. There are no innocent
bystanders; there are only those for or
those against us. The crucial issues of
the world are divided into black and
white. Opinions on these matters are
absolutely right or absolutely wrong.
Now is Special, qualitatively different
from all other times. Everything is
cast in the balance; whoever wins now
wins forever. It is the time of the final
battle between good and evil—of
Armageddon, of Ragnarok, of The
War to End All Wars.
"Gott Mit Uns," "Manifest Destiny,"
"Dieu et mon Droit," "History fights
on our side," and other such slogans
indicate our belief that the great
motivating forces of the cosmos are
for Us.
When this war is over, everything will
be vastly different. If we win, it will
be much better; if we lose, terribly
worse. The world will be deeply
changed by what we do here.
Winning or losing will change the
shape of the future.
Table 1: Shifting Perspectives of Reality in War and Peace30
30Ibid., 35.
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Leshan argues that such catastrophes as Hiroshima and Dresden would not have been
possible had the men in power been formulating strategy from a sensory rather than mythic
perspective of reality.
Hence the concept of temporal shifts in one's perspective of reality, from
sensory to mythic, even as it occurs beneath the greater rubric of a society's more enduring
constructions of reality, is of significant interest to the analyst of communal conflict. It
helps to explain the phenomenon—referred to in lay terminology as "mob mentality"~in
which groups of otherwise reasonable individuals join suddenly together to commit
seemingly inexplicable, indiscriminate acts of violence against others. Such an event,
generally short lived and followed quickly by atomization of the group's members, is
facilitated in part by a temporary, collective shift in perception to the mythic perspective of
reality.
Transitions to mythic reality vary widely in scope and duration, and manifest
equally discrepant effects on group behavior. A lynching, for instance, might exemplify a
short-term shift of extremely limited scope. World war, by contrast, represents a more
enduring transition of obviously enormous scope and consequence. In either case, it is
within such a collectively mythic perspective that the reciprocal reinforcement dynamic of
social construction may be most effectively manipulated by political pragmatists. This may
facilitate the onset of widespread vilification of communal opponents within a
fundamentally remodeled construct of reality.
3. Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
As a final conceptual tool to help comprehend the prevalence of extraordinary
brutality in communal warfare, a brief introduction to the erosion of social constraints on
behavior is instructive. Albert Bandura provides an exceptionally keen, conceptual
framework for analysis of this phenomenon, the components of which he terms "The
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Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement." 31 Although Bandura writes specifically at the
individual level of analysis, the socially constructed justifications for atavistic behavior that
he describes, apply equally to inter-group activity as well. Bandura's poignant observation
on individual behavior provides a fitting introduction to this section. He writes:
Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can be led to do
extraordinarily cruel things. 32
A brief introduction to the mechanisms by which this cruelty occurs, provides the final
point of departure from which to proceed with this paper's analysis of violent communal
conflict.
Bandura argues that self-sanction plays a central role in the regulation of
inhumane conduct. "In the course of socialization," he writes, "people adopt moral
standards that serve as guides and deterrents for conduct. Once internalized control has
developed, people regulate their actions by the sanctions they apply to themselves."33 It
follows then, that a re-socialization process such as that of reconstructing reality similarly
alters moral standards, thereby redefining or removing existing guides and deterrents for
conduct.
Self-regulatory mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated, and, as
Bandura explains, "There are many psychological processes by which moral reactions can
be disengaged from inhumane conduct." 34 This is as true for group activity as it is for
individual conduct. The perpetration of previously prohibited acts of violence upon
communal neighbors is justified through a gradual—albeit ever accelerating—process of
remodeling the perceived realities of inter-group competition. Although an in depth
31 See Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," in Origins of Terrorism,





analysis of each of Bandura's specific mechanisms is beyond the limited scope of this




• Displacement of responsibility
• Diffusion of responsibility
• Disregard for, or distortion of, consequences
• Dehumanization
• Attribution ofblame
Table 2: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
Through the above mentioned steps, both individuals and groups fundamentally redefine
their perceptions of moral reality, as regards communal competitors, thereby pardoning
themselves the self-sanction that might otherwise accompany acts of cruelty toward other
human beings. Specific examples ofboth the reconstruction and moral disengagement
processes at work will be provided in Chapters m and IV of this paper.
D. HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE
As a final point, the social construction-lens is intended to illustrate the commonly
misinterpreted role of history in communal conflict. Skilled policy analysts and media
pundits alike, too often succumb to temptations to oversimplify the significance of
"historical animosities" in defining the character of violent communal conflagrations.
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Whether its role is over-estimated or excessively discounted, the true significance of
history as a resource pool for social construction is seldom recognized.
History is sometimes represented as an all-encompassing, inescapable pre-
determinant to the course of a given conflict. Such fatalistic assessments are often cited
by policy makers intent on avoiding involvement in a foreign war. The simple but careless
explanation that the citizens of a particular communal region have always fought one
another provides a ready rationalization for inaction. Merely to call a situation "hopeless,"
however, does not a hopeless situation make. That is, while such palliatives afford a level
moral comfort to distant viewers, they have bearing neither on the true complexion of a
given conflict nor on its actual prognosis for resolution. Such labels merely complicate the
already difficult task of conflict analysis.
In other instances, analysts misidentify the role of history by discounting it entirely.
They argue that individuals are entirely responsible for their own behavior, irrespective of
the historical legacy of conflict with a competing social group. This approach is
inadequate because it ignores the role which such legacies play in establishing the very
standards of behavior to which the individual is expected to adhere.
The true significance of history to the course and character of communal conflict is
as a ready resource pool of materials for the social construction of reality. Long dormant
historical relics of jealousy, mistrust, and prejudice are—as discussed earlier—passed along
in pieces from one generation to the next and are thereby maintained within the group's
collective belief system. This accessible body of material facilitates the rapid recreation of
opposing communal groups as villainous aggressors and accounts for the speed with
which inter-group strife may be transformed to full-scale communal warfare.
In most interstate conflicts, by contrast, no such resource pool is readily available.
The story of conflict must, therefore, be constructed from nothing. The vilification
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process in such cases takes much longer and is difficult to accomplish with the same level
of comprehensiveness that regularly characterizes violent communal conflagrations. 35
Analysts should thus regard the significance of history in communal conflict as a
supply system of material for social construction. Latent stereotypes provide the
potential story-line along which, under specific conditions, a story of conflict may be
rewritten by deft, politically motivated authors. History reveals scattered pieces of
cognitive text which may be reordered by later generations and arranged on the pages of
communal life as a republished story of inter-group conflict. The book of communal
conflict thus more closely resembles a popular novel than a well-researched biography.
In summary, one reason for the intractable nature of communal warfare is that the
basic tenets of conflict are fabricated with the help of historically preserved, culturally
propagated animus. 36 Crucial to comprehending the passionate natures of such conflicts is
the realization that the issues at stake are interpreted inter-subjectively. These
interpretations, through a variety of active mechanisms, become objectified as fact within
35An interesting illustration of this point is provided in John W. Dower, War Without
Mercy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986). Dower contrasts the stark differences in the
perceptions which Americans held toward their W.W.II rivals, Japan and Germany. Partly
because of distinct differences in physical characteristics, and partly due to the long history
of prejudicial stereotypes littering America's multi-ethnic communal landscape, the
vilification process against the Japanese was prosecuted far more quickly and
comprehensively than against the Germans. The widely known discrepancies in treatment
between Japanese-Americans and their German-American counterparts during the war is
yet another example of the historical communal "resource pool" in action. See Dower, 79.
36Isaacs, 121. On the enduring and powerful influence of historically perpetuated "myths"
in ethnic conflict, Isaacs writes: "The Past remains very much alive, whether as fantasy,
fiction, or fact, whether it appears out of the mists of 'sacred' time or the smogs of
'chronological' time, whether it is recorded in holy writ or as 'history'... all kinds ofW and
'They' continue to revile and kill one another out of the memories provided by both kinds
of time and with the sanctions of both kinds of writ." Isaacs cites as an example, an
interview given by a Syrian minister of education—quoted by David Gordon (Isaacs, Ch. 7,
Note 10)—in which the minister defends the presence of violent passages about Jews in
textbooks used in Palestinian refugee camps by stating: "The hatred we instill in our
children from birth is a sacred emotion.
"
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the social constructions of reality. These realities, in turn, become regarded as threats to
the most sensitive roots of basic group identity. 37
It is important for analysts to recognize that core grievances may exist largely in the
realm of emotion, and, as objectified realities, may bear little resemblance to "objective"
reality perceived by those outside the conflict. Consequently, acknowledging the primacy
of constructed reality over "objective" fact in determining behavior is among the most
fundamental concepts to understanding communal warfare. 38 This is perhaps the most
difficult notion for intervening powers to comprehend, yet it reveals why many of the
standard mechanisms of coercive diplomacy used to mediate instrumental wars of politics
simply do not work in influencing the course of communal conflicts. As George
Santayana once wrote, "There is nothing so helpless as reason when faced with
unreason."39 Violent communal conflicts comprise subjective constructions of reality that
become objectified as essential truths to their psychological adherents. Failure to
recognize the existence of unique constructions of reality on each side of a conflict may
constitute a cognitive language barrier between combatants and mediator that simply
precludes communication.
37Ibid., 206. Isaacs writes, "The dynamism of basic group identity is a function of the mix
of what people have inherited and what they have acquired, the mix of culture past and
culture present."
38Professor Walker Connor's extensive writings on ethno-nationalism consistently argue
that "when analyzing sociopolitical situations, what ultimately matters is not what is but
what people believe is." See Connor, "A nation is a nation," Ethnic and Racial Studies
October 1978: 380; see also Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation Destroying?" World
Politics April 1972: 337.
39Cited in Leshan, 42.
30
m. THE OBJECTIVE-LENS
This paper has, thus far, discussed the first of three specific characteristics which
distinguish intra-state communal conflicts, in significant ways, from the wars which
comprise America's historical experience. Chapter II provided a basic introduction into
the powerful role which social constructions of reality play in defining communal conflicts.
This chapter addresses the second of these key characteristics: the perceived
objectives of communal conflict. 40 It examines the role which objectives—identified and
articulated through the social construction process—play in differentiating these wars from
other types of political violence. It points out that some violent communal conflicts are
interpreted as zero sum struggles for survival by the combatants within them; but that
others are clearly waged to secure politically determined objectives such as greater
political representation in government or improved social status.
This dichotomy between absolute and limited motives indicates that—depending
upon the nature of the objectives-conflicts tend toward one of two fundamentally distinct
dimensions: non-zero sum wars of politics and zero sum of struggles for existence. While
some of the world's past and present conflagrations may be characterized as being of the
former category, it is the position of this paper that many, if not most, violent communal
conflicts are perceived by the participants as being of the latter category: zero sum
struggles for existence.
40For a superb introduction of the core dynamics underlying communal conflict, see
Harold Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.)
The difficulty one encounters in the temptation to define the "rationality" of any particular
conflict is, as Lucian Pye eloquently observes in his forward to Isaac's Idols, "what have
frequently been seen as the workings of the 'irrational' are in fact the very elements that
make us human."
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Analysts seeking to mediate a specific conflict should ask some very important
questions to discern the essential character of the contest:
• What objectives are at stake?
• Are they limited, that is, governed by political calculations and consequently subject
to cost-benefit analyses and bargaining behavior?
• Are they divisible, that is, can they be divided—equitably or otherwise—between the
combatants?
• Or, as is frequently the case in communal warfare, is the objective in question
indivisible—zero sum competition in the most absolute sense—with "winner-take-all" as
the ultimate outcome?
• Finally, is the conflict perceived as a struggle for cultural or physical survival, an
objective which brooks neither cost-value calculation nor compromise?
Answers to these questions are invaluable in determining the basic complexion of
whichever conflict a mediator might face. They allow the analyst to differentiate between
non-zero sum games of politics and zero sum games of survival.
Most inter-state conflicts, indeed, all of those in America's experience, fall into the
former category as limited wars of politics. Intra-state communal conflicts, by contrast,
incline toward the latter perception as unlimited wars for survival. Distinguishing between
these two classes is the purview of policy-makers around the world as they grapple with
responses to newly emerging international conflicts. Early and accurate classification is of
paramount importance, for all subsequent policy decisions will likely derive from the initial
frame of reference.
A. CLAUSEWITZ'SZ)£//tLA^7T//?£; THEORY
The concept of wars existing along a continuum of violence, with the opposing
dimensions of limited war on one end and absolute war on the other, is not a new
concept. Carl von Clausewitz grappled with this dichotomy centuries ago, in an effort to
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explain the disparate intensities with which wars of the Eighteenth Century were
prosecuted. The perspective of this chapter differs slightly in that it seeks to position
wars, conceptually, along the Clausewitzian continuum based on the nature of the
objectives over which they are fought: Non-zero sum conflict (politics by other means) fits
toward the limited end of the spectrum, while zero sum communal warfare (survival by
other means) tends toward the absolute end. A brief introduction to Clausewitz's
perspective on the continuum's limited and absolute dimensions is useful to understanding
the zero sum/non-zero sum framework presented here as well.
Many of Clausewitz's theories on war—predicated on notions of the nation-state—are
diminishing in utility for analysts assessing the modern global environment of sub-national
ethnic and religious conflagrations. Nonetheless, some of his writings remain relevant.
Specifically, Clausewitz's concept of the dual nature of warfare is useful as a conceptual
tool with which to examine the relationship between the objectives over which a conflict is
ostensibly waged and the war's actual complexion. Moreover, this dual nature continuum
provides a cogent framework for contrasting zero sum versus non-zero sum conflicts
around the world.
The basic underpinning of Clausewitzian thought is that all wars, indeed all battles,
are different. Therefore, there exists no such thing as a norm ofwar. Consequently, there
can be no standard policy that may be applied uniformly to all conflicts. Each war is
unique in its variable composition of elements, a "remarkable trinity," composed of
violence and passion; uncertainty, chance and probability; and political purpose and
effect. 41
41 See Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Makers of Modern Strategy, Ed., Peter Paret,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986): 201.
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Clausewitz distinguishes between two levels of warfare, limited and absolute, based
primarily on objectives and scope. In his analysis of the classic work, On War, Peter Paret
cites Clausewitz's discussion of two basic types of warfare:
War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the
enemy--to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to
sign whatever . ;ace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so
that we can ? .."ex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations.
Transitions frcrr ' ne type to the other will of course recur in my treatment; but the
fact that the am ' the two types are quite different must be clear at all times, and
their points of irreconcilability brought out.
This distinction between the two kinds of war is an actual fact. But no less
practical is the importance of another point that must be made absolutely clear,
namely that war is nothing but the continuation ofpolicy with other means. If this is
firmly kept in mind throughout, it will greatly facilitate the study of the subject and
the whole will be easier to analyze. 42 (Italics in the original, underlining added for
emphasis.)
Clausewitz's dual nature theory is thus predicated upon the objectives of the political and
military leaders on each side of a given conflict.
Clausewitz held that virtually all wars are instrumental, that is, premised on rational
intent on the part of warring states' political leadership. 43 Wars are fought not for their
own sake but for a political purpose and are therefore subject to rational constraints that
influence tactics. Presumably, leaders favor those tactics that contribute most directly to
attaining specified political objectives. This is the essence of Clausewitz's concept of
limited warfare, that political motives determine both the military objectives and the
tactical means by which to attain those objectives. A purely military strategy does not
exist in limited war. 44




Clausewitz believed, in the absence of political constraints, the basic nature of
humans in combat compels opponents inexorably toward an escalation of violence. '"A
clash of forces freely operating and obedient to no law but their own,' eventually reaches
the extreme—absolute war, that is, absolute violence ending in the total destruction of one
side by the other."45 Theoretically, warfare of this nature is characterized by unrestrained,
indiscriminate violence ending in the extermination of the losing side. Clausewitz did not
believe that absolute war existed in reality because the internal dynamics of conflict are
always influenced by forces external to it. As Paret notes, "War is affected by the specific
characteristics of the states in conflict and by the general characteristics of the time—its
political, economic, technological, and social elements. These may inhibit the escalation to
total violence."46 Indeed, Clausewitz concluded that absolute war was a theoretical
construct, unreachable in real life. In the real world the absolute is always modified,
although, in select cases of genocide, it is closely approached.47
Though few conflicts in reality reach the level of absolute war, the utility of the dual
nature thesis as a framework for analyzing a wide variety of lesser intra-national conflicts
remains useful. The definitions of limited and unlimited war—dependent upon objectives-
provide theoretical boundaries between which float virtually all of the world's conflicts:
historical, present, and future. Clausewitz's approach encompasses the full range of
45Ibid., 109.
46Ibid.
47Ibid. Paret cites "certain Napoleonic campaigns, or in the attempt of one primitive tribe
attempting to exterminate another" as examples of conflicts that approached absolute war.
By expanding this definition to include specific campaigns within the context of greater
political conflagrations, the number of potential twentieth century incidents approaching
unlimited war increases broadly. The Turkish massacre of Armenians of 1915, Hitler's
campaign against the European Jews (1939-45), the intra-Yugoslavian genocide ofWorld
War II, Pol Pot's purge of "foreign influenced imperialists" in Cambodia (1975-79), and
Saddam Hussein's ongoing efforts to eradicate Iraq's Kurdish population, to name but a
few.
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organized mass violence, including intra-state communal conflict. To frame this chapter's
thesis in Clausewitzian perspective once again, non-zero sum conflict (politics by other
means) fits toward the limited end of the spectrum, while zero sum communal warfare
(survival by other means) tends toward the absolute end.
1. The Limitations of Clausewitz
Though Clausewitz's theoretical continuum is trenchant in discussing the scope
and comparative scale of warfare in general terms, it goes only part way toward providing
a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics within specific conflicts, as Yugoslavia,
from which to build appropriate American responses. Given that the study of Clausewitz
is basic to U.S. military and diplomatic doctrine, it is important to recognize the limitations
of his theories and thereby avoid misguided analysis based on inappropriate assumptions.
While Clausewitz's dual nature theory offers certain useful conceptual insights
to communal conflict resolution, there are at least two significant limitations to the
broader body of Clausewitzian theory. First, Clausewitz (writing in Europe during the
early Nineteenth Century) assumed a state-based, instrumentalist, rational actor
perspective which is of but marginal applicability to modern intra-state, mter-national—
and indeed, in some cases, />?fra-national--communal conflicts. Second, his Dual Nature
theory notwithstanding, Clausewitz's inclination toward political purpose as the
fundamental objective of war may contribute to U.S. policy makers' potentially dangerous
mirror imaging preferences when evaluating the motives of foreign parties in conflict. 48
Makers of U.S. foreign policy should beware, they will face great dilemmas in attempting
to "force-fit" diplomatic strategies designed for non-zero sum wars of politics onto
inherently zero sum wars for existence.
48
"Mirror imaging," as used here, refers to the tendency to ascribe to another the manner
of thinking that guides one's own behavior.
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B. THE ANALYST'S DILEMMA: DIFFERENTIATING ZERO SUM FROM
NON-ZERO SUM CONFLICT
To be of any practical theoretical utility, the notions of non-zero sum and zero sum
objectives of conflict must manifest distinct characteristics largely antithetical to one
another. In reality, few, if any, conflicts fall entirely into one class or the other; most
manifest elements of each. For this reason, the analyst must become conditioned to think
in terms of dimensions rather than absolutes when attempting to characterize any given
conflict.
Moreover, within a given communal conflict, reciprocal views may exist; that is, one
faction may regard the battle as a struggle for existence while the other may not. The
analyst, and certainly the policy maker, must understand each faction's core objective. Is it
political, or is it survival?
To discuss further the key role of objectives in determining the character of violent
communal conflicts, it is necessary to establish definitional distinctions between the use of
the terms "zero sum" and "non-zero sum" as analytic concepts.
1. Non-Zero Sum Conflict
Non-zero sum conflict, as discussed here, falls within the basic confines of the
prevailing paradigm for conflict analysis which holds that political purpose governs
military means and objectives. "Violence should express political purpose," as Peter Paret
notes in his classic work Understanding War, "and express it in a rational, utilitarian
manner; it should not take the place of the political purpose, nor obliterate it."49 This
notion is useful, albeit potentially deceiving, to analysts because it implies that political
leaders in all conflicts implement basic cost-benefit analyses in establishing their goals. In
49See Paret, Understanding War, 1 10.
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the non-zero sum (limited) view of war, the traditional American perspective, leaders
gauge the expected value of a particular objective against the expected cost of achieving
it.
50 This basic principle may be expressed as a ratio (EV/EC) where:
Expected Value (gain) Relative .desirability of
= a particular venture
Expected Cost (loss)
The resultant dividend must equal or exceed " 1 " for the venture to be properly considered
as an instrumental, rational strategy of limited war; that is, the expected value to be gained
must be equal to or greater than the expected cost of securing the intended objective. 51
The degree to which these theoretical expectations become reality is determined in the
doing, by strategies, tactics, war-fighting ability, and a host of other variables
encompassed by Clausewitz's famous imponderables, which separate the theory of battle
from war as it truly is.
To summarize, the classifier non-zero sum describes a conflict involving
divisible political objectives and measured trade-offs aimed at achieving these objectives.
That is, the objective may be divided—equitably or otherwise—between the groups in
conflict. The ultimate outcome is subject to bargaining strategies and coercive diplomacy,
both violent and non-violent. This is a fundamental point for U.S. policy-makers to
recognize. It bears particular significance tc jnerica's efforts to mediate or intervene in
non-zero sum conflicts. The key factor in such instrumental wars of politics is the EV/EC
50An insightful analysis of the rationale behind beginning and ending wars is provided by
Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York, Columbia University Press, 1971).
Citing the potentially grave costs of embarking upon war, Ikle writes: "Indeed, after
prolonged and costly fighting, not only the losing nations but also the victors are often
torn by political upheavals." (59.) Ikle's assertion that grave risks exist in precipitating
conflict is empirically founded and, hence, one must assume that rational political leaders
expect the value to be gained from an offensive military enterprise to be substantial.
51For a far more comprehensive, theoretical analysis of the "rational actor" model of
international relations, see Bueno do Mesquita, The War Trap.
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ratio described above. The strategic endgame of intervention is to raise the aggressor's
costs of continued warfare (EC ft) to a point above the value it expects to gain (EC >
EV), thereby lessening the desirability of the entire enterprise (EV/EC U).
2. The Tendency Toward Zero Sum
Because the objectives at stake in many communal conflicts are essentially non-
political—namely, preservation of culture, homeland, and physical survival—these conflicts
manifest a marked tendency toward "zero sum." The term zero sum, borrowed from the
vocabulary of economists, describes a hypothetical situation in which a "resource pool"~
the objective of any given competition—is finite and indivisible. Competition for resources
in a "zero sum game" is therefore absolute. One gains only as another loses. In such a
scenario, it is not possible to cooperatively expand the resource pool so that both
competitors can increase their individual holdings simultaneously and each emerge as
winners. One must win and one must lose. Hence total gain for one equals total loss for
the other.
In examining political violence we may, with only minor alterations, use the
zero sum concept to qualify conflicts both between states and between social groups
within states. Like the economic version, this "zero sum" classification requires that the
objectives in question be perceived by the competitors to be finite. To add definitional
rigor, it will be used here to describe specifically those conflicts in which the competing
parties perceive their struggles to be absolute in the sense that one wins all and survives,
while the other loses all and perishes. In such conflicts it may be inferred that a "war of
existence" mentality exists on the part of at least one, if not each, of the opposing sides.
Clearly, a battle against an aggressor's attempt to exterminate a cultural or
racial minority would be considered zero sum by the beleaguered minority. Similarly, a
struggle to defend one's homeland against the territorial aggression of a hostile communal
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opponent would be regarded as essentially zero sum in nature. 52 Social environments rich
with latent communal strife abound with leaders and followers who are willing to view
alternatives from a zero sum perspective. It is this perspective which precipitates
indiscriminate violence by armed factions thereby creating an environment of incoherent
force. It is these acts of seemingly random violence which fuel rapid, often unpalatable
escalation.
Yet again, a recurring malady of American diplomacy, the tendency to mirror
image, has become manifest in foreign policy. At the inter-state level, analysts mirror
image by attributing to belligerent governments precisely the same mechanisms of
decision-making that govern U.S. policy. Since Americans generally view war in
instrumental terms, namely, as military means to a political end, there is a strong tendency
to project this same mind set upon participants in foreign conflicts as well. Mirror imaging
may lead American analysts to define the objective of a particular conflict as non-zero sum
(ergo negotiable), while the combatants' own perceptions may be quite different. One-
dimensional analyses which ignore social constructions of reality that do not match those
of the U.S. yield myopic and misinformed conclusions which, in turn, yield bad policies.
52Some scholars downplay the significance of ancient inter-ethnic antagonisms in
distinguishing communal conflicts as a unique class of warfare. They hold that ethnic wars
are merely campaigns of territorial aggression by another name, see Professor Peter
Waldmann's paper entitled "Violent Separatism," presented at the World Congress of the
International Political Science Association, 1988 . This position does not contradict, but
rather supports the concept of the zero sum nature of communal warfare. It would be
difficult to argue that eradication of a culture via forced expulsion of its members from
their ethnic homelands (e.g. Jews of antiquity, nineteenth century American Indians, et al)
would be regarded as significantly less absolute, by the victims, than outright physical
genocide. Therefore, I propose that the defense of territorial homelands against
aggression might be regarded as no less zero sum than would the resurgence of a. Hitlerite
"final solution," or another such campaign bent on the physical destruction of members of
a specifically targeted ethnic or religious group.
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U.S. policy toward Bosnia will be discussed later in this chapter as a possible example of
the pitfalls associated with such an approach.
C. STRATEGIES FOR MEDIATION
If one accepts that the objectives upon which conflicts are predicated run to the
extreme dimensions of politics and survival, then one must agree that no single approach
to war resolution is suitable for all situations. The zero sum/non-zero sum dichotomy
elaborated thus far in this chapter, argues that identifying the objectives upon which many
violent communal conflicts are based provides essential guidance for the adoption of
strategies appropriate for each individual circumstance.
1. Existing Strategies for Non-Zero Sum Conflict
America's diplomatic arsenal has evolved from participation in instrumental
(non-zero sum) wars of politics at the inter-state level. Its available means of coercive
diplomacy thus include a variety of military and non-military tactics designed to
accomplish such intervention.
At the lowest level of intensity are subtle diplomatic pressures intended to
express the U.S. Government's displeasure with a given conflict, or with morally
unacceptable military tactics occurring therein. Early in disagreements between foreign
countries, policy makers endeavor to communicate America's desire for a peaceful
resolution via implied threats at the lowest possible diplomatic level. If necessary to
increase pressure, the U.S. may offer to sponsor negotiations between opposing parties.
Non-participation is discouraged by threats of suspending economic assistance programs,
if such exist, or by the interruption of established trade patterns between the U.S. and
either or all belligerents. Should a hostile government remain intransigent to diplomatic
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measures, a number of forcible military options exist for intervention in a non-zero sum
conflict scenario.
Economic blockades by air, land, or sea are among the least destructive
options that function specifically to raise the economic costs of continued resistance to
negotiated settlement. The success of any economic embargo is dependent upon a number
of variables including but not limited to: the extent to which neighboring countries support
or oppose the embargo; the level of economic self-sufficiency and reserves within the
penalized country; the degree of solidarity among the sanctioned populace in favor of its
leaders' objectives; and perhaps most importantly, the aggressor's pain threshold, that is,
the price that country is willing to pay to realize its military ambitions. Embargoes may
also be applied selectively, denying the aggressor access to economic and military
supplies, while simultaneously providing the defender precisely those types of assistance.
Successful embargoes raise the costs of continued aggression considerably, but
often require more time to take effect than a beleaguered defender can sustain. In such
cases, direct intervention by external military force becomes necessary. Those powers
contemplating intervention must then reassess the economic and political capital they are
willing to expend to stop the hostilities, and choose from the military options available at a
price deemed acceptable.
Strategic bombing, a tool popularized by success in the Persian Gulf War, has
become a method of choice in forcible coercive diplomacy. 53 Bombs are relatively
inexpensive compared to ground-force intervention and, more importantly, they represent
to the American public a relatively sterile mechanism for dispensing measured retribution.
As Lewis Gann notes, "An air raid in some ways appears like a catastrophe of nature," a
53For but one of countless examples of politicians favoring immediate bombing as the
solution in Bosnia, see Dennis Deconcini, "Bomb the Serbs. Now." New York Times 18
May 1993, nat'l. ed.: A15.
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catastrophe whose wrath falls primarily upon those most deserving of retribution. 54 For
these and other reasons, strategic bombing is often touted as a panacea in congressional
debates on military intervention. 55 The dilemma of coercive air power is that effectiveness
varies with terrain: open, flat areas with little cover are particularly good; mountain and
jungle areas affording both cover and concealment are especially poor. 56 Nonetheless,
strategic bombing can be a quick, effective means to raise the costs of continued warfare
by exacting a heavy toll on the economic and military infrastructures of the targeted state
in an instrumental war of politics.
Failure to penetrate the aggressor's pain threshold by implementing the
previously mentioned options may forewarn of incomplete analyses on the part of external
mediators. Such was clearly the case in the Persian Gulf War where Iraq's President,
Saddam Hussein, faced obviously insurmountable odds yet refused to withdraw from
Kuwait. Despite an enormous, unified international military coalition led by the world's
54Lewis Gann, Guerrillas in History (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971):
79.
55U.S. military officials including former JCS Chairman, General Colin Powell, and current
Chairman, General John Shalikashvili, have repeatedly testified before Congress explaining
the limitations of air power and urging caution. Misha Glenny cites testimony by General
Shalikashvili, and offers his own admonitions regarding strategic bombing in "What Is To
Be Done," The New York Review 27 May 1993: 16. Glenny writes: "General John
Shalikashvili recently counseled caution. 'Bombing limited targets, for instance, is more
difficult than people think and there is also no guarantee that such an act would bring a
party to the negotiating table.' This means that bombing risks further inflaming the
situation on the ground for no real purpose other than an understandable but misguided
desire for retribution—retribution that may also kill civilians." Glenny concludes, "The
great problem with the bombing that has recently been proposed is that it has no clear
political policy that it wishes to reinforce—it is instead an expression of moral indignation,
which is quite justified, masquerading as policy."
56An excellent discussion of the prospects for strategic bombing in Bosnia is provided in
John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer," New Republic 14 June 1993:
24-25. Pape and Mearsheimer write: "In theory, air power can be used three different
ways: to decapitate an opponent's leadership, to punish an opponent's population or to
weaken an opponent's military forces. Of these, only the last stands a chance of being
effective, but only if it is applied in conjunction with groundpower." (Emphasis added.)
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greatest military super-power, Hussein refused to back down. Enormous costs had
already been levied by heavy Allied bombardment of Iraqi troops, equipment, and
infrastructure, and the promise of long-term, crippling economic sanctions against his
country was certain to be fulfilled. Nonetheless, Allied intervention with ground troops
was required to finally expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait. As an international pariah, Iraq
continues today to pay the heavy costs of its leader's ill-considered behavior.
If air campaigns fail to halt hostilities, ground force intervention remains the
only feasible choice. In such a case, U.S. or coalition ground troops may be required to
physically evict the aggressor from contested territory, increasing enemy ground losses
beyond the price it is willing or able to pay. In the process, sufficient damage must be
inflicted to give considerable pause to jingoistic aggression in the future. Once the
contested territory is secured and a local government reestablished, coalition forces may
be withdrawn. A repeat performance will be severely inhibited because the aggressor's
costs will have proven to far outweigh the political value it expected to gain.
In summary, a fairly wide range of options exists for influencing instrumental
(non-zero sum) wars fought between states to achieve limited political gains. A state
seeking a political objective attaches to it a given value that determines the price it is
v' ?i:ig to pay to win it (basic principles of cost/benefit analysis). Achievement of the
jal obiective is thereby governed by a calculus of strategic bargaining in which the
idtio of (. "3d value to expected cost (EV/EC) determines whether or not state will
resort to war. This is the single most significant characteristic of non-zero sum wars for
policy makers to understand: such conflicts may, theoretically, be effectively influenced
through standard mechanisms ofcoercive diplomacy.
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2. Zero Sum Conflict in Contrast
In marked contrast to the logical Clausewitzian precepts governing non-zero
sum warfare, the objectives in zero sum conflict are perceived as issues essential to basic
group survival. 57 Participants within such conflicts often believe themselves to be engaged
in an absolute fight for life. In such situations, the standard mechanisms of coercive
diplomacy are of significantly diminished utility.
In analyzing zero sum conflicts, the key role of social constructed reality
becomes clearly evident. At the very least, combatants regard their struggles as a wholly
justified defense of ancestral homelands, and heroic resistance against a territorial
aggressor bent upon driving them from their land. In many instances, each participant to
the conflict similarly regards the geographically finite region of land as rightfully his. The
attempts of each to expel or exterminate the other serve merely to reinforce the conviction
of a zero-sum battle for survival on all sides.
For external mediators, approximate valuation of the relatively mundane
political objectives over which limited wars are fought may be a fairly simple task. The
issues comprising zero sum communal conflict, by contrast, are predicated upon socially
constructed perceptions of reality that may differ entirely from the "objective" reality
perceived by mediators outside the conflict. Such zero sum communal conflicts arise,
ostensibly, from ethnic and religious hatreds, and resurgent historic nationalism, and are
inextricably linked to such immutable concepts as homeland and basic group identity. 5 *
57This thesis was presented by Professor Walker Connor, in a series of lectures on the
subject of ethno-national conflict, 19-24 April 1993, at the Naval Post Graduate School,
Monterey, California.
58See Cynthia Enloe's superb work on the ethnic and communal dynamics of divided
societies, Ethnic Soldiers (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980). Enloe's simple
ascriptive definition of ethnicity: "a basis of collective identity derived from shared descent
and rooted in sub-rational emotions" supports the basic working concept with which this
paper proceeds in its discussion of communal conflict. (Emphasis added, 4.)
45
Communal warfare of this nature quickly becomes—to play upon the famous Clausewitzian
maxim—expressions ofpassion by other means.
This is significant because conflicts waged for objectives believed to be crucial
to a group's physical or cultural survival are far less constrained, if at all, by political
considerations. For this reason zero sum conflict conceptually resembles the specter of
absolute war discussed earlier in this paper. In contrast to its limited, non-zero sum
counterpart, the objectives of zero sum conflict are, theoretically, much less subject to
standard mechanisms ofcoercive diplomacy.
Efforts to uniformly apply the same set of diplomatic strategies to both zero
sum and non-zero sum conflicts are doomed to failure for at least four reasons. First, zero
sum conflict is defined by issues seldom subject to rational bargaining strategies, thus
making diplomatic pressures irrelevant. Second, zero sum conflict is widely perceived by
the combatants to be a battle for national or cultural survival, thereby making success a
national imperative at whatever cost is required (EVflu). Third, short of long-term
pseudo-colonial occupation or total annihilation of the aggressor force, intervening
powers cannot raise the expected costs (EC) of continued aggression high enough to
secure lasting peace—making the EV/EC ratio irrelevant. And, fourth, any punitive
external measures are likely to reinforce the targeted party's sense of victimization causing
it to assume an increasingly fatalistic and recalcitrant stance. For these reasons alone,
intervention in zero sum conflicts requires a fundamental reappraisal of coercive
diplomacy. 59
59Commenting on the importance of developing a dynamic approach to mediating such
conflicts, Misha Glenny writes: "There are dozens of other nationalist disputes fermenting
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In order to find a long-term solution for
these problems, a normative system must be developed and applied to these regions. At
the moment, the international community lacks this and is also short of resources...The
more these disputes develop into open warfare, the more urgent the need for a systematic
approach to these problems becomes, but given the pressures which are determining
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D. A LOUSY VIEW: YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH THE OBJECTIVE-LENS
The potential ineffectualness of misguided policy is nowhere more evident than in
the republics of the former Yugoslavia, clear examples of zero sum warfare in all its fury.
From the beginning, Western leaders ignored the significance of complex ethno-national
bonds between the Yugoslav republics. Recognition was granted to the seceding states of
Slovenia and Croatia long before policy makers realized the significance of the grievances
expressed by the large Serb minorities opposing secession within each republic. 60 In
Bosnia, the West collectively ignored the sole legal mechanism of stability, the principle of
dual sovereignty, which required that constitutional changes be agreed upon by the
republic's three constituent nations. This safeguard was shelved by Bosnia's Muslims and
Croats who used support from Germany and the EC to declare independence by
referendum in March, 1992, in spite of the Serbs' fears. Thus with the hapless
encouragement of Western powers—ignorant of the powder keg with which they trifled--
war in Bosnia was diplomatically precipitated.
It is incorrect, however, to ascribe too much responsibility for Yugoslavia's current
plight to Western powers, for the war is essentially home-grown. It is built upon fears of
foreign policy development in the USA, Europe and Japan, it is unlikely that an
international political model for combating nationalist instability will be created." See The
Fall, 100.
60See Misha Glenny, "The Yugoslav War as the 'Revenger's Tragedy'," Meeting Report,
Woodrow Wilson Center for East European Studies, #81, 8 Apr. 1993: 4. To the
question: "What should the West be doing in the Balkans?" Glenny responds, "First, it
must be honest and admit that it has made a substantial contribution to the chaos in the
region. The Western diplomatic community completely failed to anticipate a well-signaled
conflict. Policy-makers must recognize that the West has made serious mistakes,
particularly the premature recognition of Croatia, and that it is too late to hope for a 'just'
solution. The West must act pragmatically because it has lost the opportunity to act in a
principled fashion." (Emphasis added.)
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aggression and genocide between one party which claims Bosnia as part of its "historic"
homeland, and the others which have occupied the majority of the region for centuries.
The present viciousness of the warfare in Bosnia is the product of reinvented nationalist
hatred, and distortions of history that reach near farcical proportions on all sides. 61 Each
of the opposing groups holds the others in bizarre caricature, attributing to them the most
sinister, sub-human attributes, none of which bear much resemblance to the truth. Yet, in
communal conflicts, truth is seldom an equal match against national myths. The people of
Yugoslavia no longer view themselves as citizens of a state but rather as members of
psychological security collectives within a finite territory in which their group only is
justified to exist. 62
The Serbs have shown clearly that their two main objectives—the achievement of a
geographically contiguous Greater Serbia, and ethnic homogeneity within Serb territories
—are issues not subject to diplomatic compromise. Clearly, the Muslims' battle to retain a
place within a viable Bosnian state is regarded as a struggle for cultural survival , and the
siege-style artillery attacks in such places as Sarajevo and Mostar represent to the Muslims
an obvious struggle for physical survival as well. These goals have become equated in the
general consciousness with national survival. Illustrations of a pervasive solidarity in Serb
national consciousness—one which transcends state boundaries—are replete throughout the
61The most absurd abuses of history are embraced by Serbs in their attempts to justify the
brutal aggression in Bosnia. See Edward Barnes, "Behind The Serbian Lines," Time 17
May 1993: 34. Barnes writes, "The fighters live in what can only be called 'Serbian
reality," the world as defined by the propaganda, lies, myth and aggrieved sense of history
that have been swallowed whole by the population. They are certain that the fascists and
the Islamic fundamentalists are at their throats. They are sure that the Muslims and Croats
who once lived next door are nothing short of monsters. An army medical officer
explained that Croat children are taught that Serbs' most popular sport is killing children."
See also, Glenny, The Fall, 85.
62See Gramoz Pashko, "The Balkans: Ethnic Identity Versus The Modern Nation," World
Press Review June 1993: 8.
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periodical literature emerging from the Balkans. For many Serbs the war is truly regarded
as a zero sum game, in the most classic sense, against an Islamic onslaught from the west.
A sample of the mind-set typical of many Serb officials throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia is provided by an interview with Simo Drljaca, the police chief of Prijedor,
Bosnia:
You Americans do not understand ethnic warfare because you fight only clean wars,
like Kuwait and Vietnam. We do not have that luxury. We Serbs are fighting to save
ourselves from genocide. In ethnic warfare the enemy doesn't wear a uniform or
carry a gun. Everyone is the enemy. (Emphasis added.)63
Far from representing an anomaly of the radical fringe, Mr. Drljaca's perspective reflects
mainstream Serb opinion. Such absolute views help explain, at least in part, the atavistic
behavior that has come to characterize the greater Balkan conflict. Unbridled brutality has
been the rule in Bosnia, rather than the exception.
Similar observations on the essentially zero sum Serb perceptions of the Yugoslav
war are illustrated by Misha Glenny, in The Fall of Yugoslavia. He recounts a
conversation with a policeman in the Bosnian city of Tuzla:
I took a short walk with a local Serb policeman to discuss the situation with him. He
confirmed the countless observations which I had made when talking to local fighters
of all nationalities—he was not a man of evil. On the contrary, he explained how he
found it very difficult to shoot at the other side of his village, because he knew
everybody who lived there. But the war had somehow arrived and he had to defend
his home. The man was confused and upset by the events but he now perceived the
Green Berets and the Ustashas to be a real threat to his family. "We cannot let them
form an Islamic state here," he said with genuine passion. "Are you sure they want
to?" I asked him. "Of course they want to . I don't understand why you people
outside don't realize that we are fighting for Europe against a foreign religion." There
was nothing disingenuous about this simple man. His only mistake was to believe the
nonsense that his local community had learned from Serbian television and the local
branch of the SDS. He, too, is a victim.64
63See Maj. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson, "Who Will Sweep Up The Augean Stables?" Army
May 1993:23.
64Glenny, The Fall, 171-72.
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The depth of Yugoslavia's crisis is due to such widespread zero sum perceptions, each
feeding upon the next, embellished along the way by a simple yet frightened people whose
lives have been deeply scarred by limitless violence. This environment of fear, revived
ethnic hatred, and pseudo-nationalist fervor has been deftly manipulated by ex-Communist
Serb politicians, such as •' bodan Milosevic, to tighten their tenuous grasp on power.
The distinction '"* veen zero sum and non-zero sum conflict is particularly
salient in light of current wars in Yugoslavia and elsewhere. The Balkan conflict, misread
by American analysts from the outset, has since been poorly handled by both the Bush and
Clinton Administrations. Because of the failure to correctly recognize key internal
dynamics of the conflict, diplomats dithered as the war expanded. Through a series of
inappropriate bluffs and half-measures, the zero sum communal competition in Bosnia has
been inadvertently prolonged while simultaneously sustaining damage to America's
credibility as the world's leader.65
E. A GLOBAL OVERVIEW THROUGH THE OBJECTIVE-LENS
As a final illustration of the prevalence of perceived zero-sum objectives in
communal conflict, a brief glance at several of the world's currently raging civil wars
should suffice. Communal conflicts as disparate as those in Israel (Jews vs. Palestinians),
the Sudan (Northern Islamic Arabs and Southern Arab tribes vs. Southern Black African
Christians/Aminists), Iraq (Sunni Muslims vs. Kurds and Shiites), Somalia (inter-clan
65For but one of many articles arguing the potential global implications of America's failure
in Bosnia, see "The Abdication," by the editors of the New Republic 28 Feb. 1994: 1-9.
Specifically regarding the repercussions of America's damaged credibility they write, "the
American interests that are implicated by the Serbian war are not only regional, they are
also global. The audience for Bill Clinton's prevarications includes Kim II Sung and
Saddam Hussein and Raoul Cedras and Mohamed Farah Aidid and a host of petty fascists
in fledgling states who have been wondering about their freedom of action. And what he
is telling them all is: act freely, we are busy with ourselves. Clinton does not see that he is
making a more recalcitrant world." (9.)
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warfare between Somalis), and, as previously discussed, Bosnia (inter-factional warfare
between Serbs, Croats and Muslims), illustrate but a few of the various faces of zero sum
conflict spreading rapidly across the globe. Although each of these conflicts differs
significantly from the others, they are also similar in many ways. Perhaps the strongest
single thread running through the group is the absolute nature of the objectives upon
which each conflict is predicated.
1. Israel
The long-running battle between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews in the
occupied territories of Israel's West Bank and Gaza regions provides an apt example of
zero sum objectives in conflict. Specifically, the recent proliferation of random violence
between radical Jewish settlers and militant Palestinians comes out of what is broadly
perceived to be a battle for survival by each side of the conflict. In a recent article for the
New York Times, columnist William Safire accurately, if not altogether objectively,
summarized the objectives that have come to define the conflict:
The goal of the warmakers is not lunatic: each seeks the expulsion of the other form
"their" territory. The Hebron killer's Kach faction wants Arabs driven across the
Jordan River, while Hamas, the Hezbollah and Fatah hawks want Jews driven out of
the West Bank and ultimately into the sea. 66
The main reason the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has remained so intractable for so long is
that both sides regard the communal competition in classically zero sum terms. Each sees
the land in question as rightfully "theirs," any prospective gain for the Arabs coming
directly from a loss to the Jews. Hence Jewish settlers have vowed to defend their homes
and families at all costs . After a settler was killed in El Bireh, the West Bank, last
December, the response of the Jews was explosive. Angry settlers blocked traffic and
66See William Safire, "Peacemaking After Hebron," New York Times 2 Feb. 1994, nat'l.
ed.: All.
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stoned Arab's cars on two highways in the West Bank and Gaza and warned reporters of
impending doom if the government enacted its plan to arm Arab policemen in the regions
as a provision of the agreement on Palestinian self-rule. As Pinas Wallerstein, leader of
the settlers around El Bireh, argued to New York Times reporter Joel Greenberg, "Don't
give them guns, because they'll be used to slaughter us. Today's incident will be a minor
episode compared to the massacre that will take place here."67 Aharon Domb, spokesman
for the Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, similarly warned "Any armed
Arab policeman is a terrorist as far as we're concerned, and if we run into him on a
highway, I'll open fire."68
Palestinians, by contrast, see the frequently violent reactions of the Israeli Army and
random attacks by Jewish settlers, such as the recent Hebron massacre, as clear campaigns
of extermination waged by Jews in an effort to drive Arabs permanently from the
contested territories. Palestinians at a recent ceremony mourning the victims of the
Hebron attack issued militant invectives promising retribution. Sheik Taysir Bayud al-
Tamimi, the chief Muslim judge of Hebron, invoked a historical legacy of atrocities in his
calls for action:
The Crusaders killed 70,000 Muslims, but it wasn't as terrible as this. There has never
been such a crime. We must fight to liberate our country. The peace negotiations
must stop. 69
Other Palestinian mourners issued still graver threats, with one sign reading "We will kill
every last Jew until not a single one of them remains on the face of our land," and another
which read "God bless those who are martyred resisting the Jews." 70 Although these
67See Joel Greenberg, "After Palestinians Kill Israeli, Settlers' Response Is Violent," New
York Times 2 Dec. 1993, nat'l. ed.: A8.
68Ibid.
69See Joel Greenberg, "Hebron Mourners Predict Bloodshed," New York Times 2 Mar.
1994, nat'l. ed.: A4.
70Ibid.
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statements followed in the wake of an unusually severe incident of violence, they express
sentiments held by substantial sectors of the population on both sides of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Such zero sum perceptions promise not only to thwart higher level
negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli government, but will also ensure that the
volatile conflict remains continually primed for flashes of random, brutal violence such as
the incident in Hebron.
2. The Sudan
The seemingly endless civil war in Sudan reveals yet another face of zero sum
communal conflict. There the battle is not for homelands, but rather for physical, religious
and cultural survival of the southern Christian and animist tribes. The northern Arab
Islamic government in Khartoum has, for the past ten years, been engaged in an especially
brutal ongoing campaign to extend Islam throughout the country.
Sudan's supreme leader is intent upon eradicating all vestiges of Christianity
and animism, thereby creating a mono-cultural state in sync with the Islamic theocracy in
Khartoum. This absolute objective has been pursued directly by Sudanese military
campaigns against the southern rebel forces; and indirectly by sponsoring proxy warfare
between Arab and Christian tribes in the south, and by intentionally blocking international
efforts to mitigate the massive starvation problem which Khartoum has encouraged
throughout the southern regions. As New York Times reporter Donatella Lorch recently
observed, "More than two million Sudanese are at risk as a severe drought and new
fighting in the southern part of the country threaten the worst famine in the Sudan since
1988, when about 280,000 people died." This is a potential disaster dwarfing the 300,000
Somali deaths which precipitated United Nations intervention. 71
71See Donatella Lorch, "Drought and Fighting Imperil 2 Million in Sudan," New York
Times 10 Feb. 1994, nat'l. ed.: A3.
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Clearly, for the non-Islamic people of the southern Sudan, the war is a battle
for cultural survival. Because of the government's strategic campaigns to foster the
South's starvation dilemma, however, the war is also a zero sum battle for physical
existence. Recent comments by the current U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan, Donald
Petterson, reveal a somewhat limited recognition of the absolute nature of objectives at
stake. Ambassador Petterson has emerged as an equal critic of both government and
rebels, stating "Neither side has shown readiness for fundamental compromises to make a
settlement. It takes two to tango and they haven't even gotten on the ballroom floor."72
The problem with the Ambassador's over-simplification is that it ignores a subtle, yet
fundamental difference between the two parties' situations: the Islamic government
seemingly will not compromise in its singular goal to create a homogenous Islamic state;
but, because the objectives for which the southern tribes fight are zero sum in the most
absolute sense, they cannot compromise. Hence the war in Sudan continues to rage, and
will likely do long into the future.
3. Iraq
Like Sudan, the situation in Iraq involves the determined attempts by a Sunni
Muslim dictatorship to use its military forces indiscriminately to eradicate the country's
"troublesome" ethnic and religious minorities. The objective at stake both for the
beleaguered Kurds in Iraq's northern border regions and for the country's Shiite Muslims
of the southern marshes is, quite literally, survival. Saddam Hussein has, in the past, used
all available military means in the quest to destroy Kurdish resistance forces in the north,
including indiscriminate chemical warfare attacks against many Kurdish villages. 73 The
offensive against the Kurds having been temporarily thwarted by the UN protectorate, the
72Ibid.
73See Graham E. Fuller, "The Fate of the Kurds," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 2 (Spring
1993): 108-121.
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Iraqi government has turned instead to the eradication of its troublesome Shiite population
in the country's 6,000 square mile southern marsh region.
Hussein's forces are presently engaged in a renewed program of what might
best be termed environmental genocide to sever the rebels' lifeline to the southern
marshes. By damming and redirecting water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the
region's two main feeders, the Sunni government has succeeded in drying up more than
half the vast wetlands and pushing thousands of people deeper into the marshes and into
Iran. 74 Rebel officials estimate that 50,000 Shiites have been killed since the uprisings
following the GulfWar, and at least a third of the southern region's 200,000 residents have
recently fled their homelands in the marshes. 75 The campaign of eradication has also
included chemical weapons attacks against Shiite villages as well as widespread poisoning
of the standing bodies of water remaining in the region. Thus through the combination of
direct military attacks and indirect deprivation, Hussein's Sunni forces are systematically
waging a zero sum strategy of extermination and expulsion against the southern Shiites.
The campaign is decimating the ancient culture of the marsh Arabs, known as the Maadan,
which stretches back 5,000 years. 76
Iraq's Kurdish and Shiite populations are without the military means to raise
serious opposition to the Iraqi government forces, and yet their futile struggles continue.
This is because the objectives at stake are basic cultural and physical survival, and defeat is
widely perceived to equal death. No party in any conflict is likely submit under such
conditions, but rather will likely resist to the last man. The Kurds and Shiites of Iraq are
engaged in zero sum battles for existence, an objective over which it is simply not possible
74See Chris Hedges, "In a Remote Southern Marsh, Iraq Is Strangling the Shiites," New




to bargain. In such cases, the claim that fighting is a "means to an end" loses all meaning.
Rather, merely to continue becomes an end in itself.
4. Somalia
The communal crisis in Somalia—past, present, and future—is a situation with
which, via the humanitarian media blitz in 1992 and a subsequent costly military
experience, America has become painfully familiar. For this reason we will not dwell long
here providing background to the conflict. It is relevant, however, to illustrate an aspect
of the objective-lens (and of zero sum/non-zero sum perceptions) that differs from that
applied to the cases discussed earlier.
Somalia descended into chaos in the wake of a particularly severe drought in
1990, which precipitated rampant crop failure throughout the country. As the death toll
from starvation began to mount, international aid agencies poured into the country hoping
to mitigate famine. Civil war erupted as the country's most powerful clan, led by General
Mohammed Farah Aidid, sought absolute political power over the country. With inter-
clan warfare expanding, agricultural production suffered further interruptions thus
exacerbating the growing famine situation.
Aidid's clan enjoyed military success and began quickly to monopolize limited
aid resources by force, thereby leaving the remaining Somalis to starve. In an effort to
establish national political and military hegemony, Aidid and his fellow clansmen
effectively halted subsistence aid to the rest of the country. The synergism between war
and famine was devastating to Somalia, and created a unique version of violent zero sum
competition on two fronts.
Aidid's personal quest for absolute power created a zero sum political contest
in which either he would become "king" or the country would disintegrate. Inter-militia
warfare shattered the Somalia's means of agricultural subsistence and Aidid monopolized
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the international community's aid resources, thereby imposing a zero sum battle for
existence upon the weaker rival clans. In the vicious zero sum cycle of escalation typical
of violent communal conflict in the Third World, civil war exacerbated famine, even as a
decreasing food supply pushed the stakes of losing on the battlefield ever higher.
The analytically interesting aspect of the Somali case is that, by unfortunate
coincidence, one zero sum contest created another. Aidid's refusal to accept a power
sharing coalition with other clan leaders—perhaps as "first among equals'—produced a
zero sum campaign for an indivisible objective: absolute political power. This zero sum
power struggle erupted in rampant militia warfare which halted agricultural production
and interrupted relief supplies, thereby creating the second zero sum contest: a starvation
induced struggle for survival. Zero sum perceptions thus exist on all sides of Somalia's
civil war, but the subjective interpretations of the objective at stake—ergo constructions of
reality—differ greatly between Aidid's faction and the lesser clans. Aidid perceives the
battle as a winner-take-all grab for political power. To the rest of the country, however,
the struggle is to survive.
Aidid's offensive was interrupted briefly by the arrival of UN military peace-
keepers late in 1992. From the outset, however, UN strategists—including the U.S.
Central Command—misinterpreted the absolute nature of the conflict. By regarding the
war merely as the product of uncoordinated inter-tribal warfare, inspired primarily by the
prevailing subsistence crisis, the UN constructed its strategy for mediation on the basis of
a seriously flawed assumption. UN planners assumed that a coalition peace-keeping force
would play the role as impartial referee, standing between the combatants—arms
outstretched in either direction—permitting relief agency personnel to scurry about
distributing needed foodstuffs. With famine mitigated—the cause ofwar thus removed—it
was thought that the clans would come quickly to a power-sharing arrangement and go
straight to the business of rebuilding the country's agricultural base.
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Looking through the objective-lens, it becomes clear that the UN's most critical
mistake came even before the relief campaign, dubbed Provide Comfort, had begun.
Strategists failed to recognize early that Aidid and his faction, the "Somali National
Alliance," regarded the objective in question as essentially indivisible , hence, non-
negotiable. By focusing exclusively on the zero sum struggle against starvation, the UN
unwittingly set about treating a mere symptom of Somalia's communal illness rather than
attacking the disease itself. It underestimated the value which General Aidid placed on
establishing and maintaining an absolute monopoly over the political and military power in
Somalia.
Upon entry of the UN force into Somalia, however, General Aidid revealed to
all his interpretation of the contest. Rather than join in a collective effort to establish
governmental and agricultural stability, Aidid launched a guerrilla campaign directed
against the mediators who would deprive him his kingdom. The UN coalition was slow to
identify a change in the complexion of conflict and its eventual reaction was haphazard.
Though it ultimately became clear that Aidid would have to be deposed
forcibly before a modicum of peace might be secured, neither adequate equipment
inventories nor appropriate strategies were in place to conduct effective counter-guerrilla
warfare. Moreover, it was far from clear that the enthusiasm which UN member-states
displayed for a humanitarian relief effort would translate to the prosecution of a potentially
messy counter-insurgent campaign.
In short order, cracks began to appear in the UN coalition. In the face of
significant public and congressional outcry over the deaths of American soldiers in
Mogadishu, the Clinton Administration elected to extricate itself from the communal
morass and declare victory. With its military engine gone, the UN coalition became
irrelevant.
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Already, only weeks after the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia, random attacks
and robberies of relief agencies have begun to proliferate rapidly and serious fighting has
erupted between clans in the southern port city of Kismayu. Many relief agencies are
reducing their operations. 77 General Aidid, having apparently faced down the world's
greatest power, is now stronger than ever before. Furthermore, the harsh reality of limited
resources of subsistence precludes all meaningful compromise between the lesser clans as
they scramble to survive. Lieutenant Colonel Raoul Archambault, executive officer of the
U.S. Falcon Brigade preparing to leave Somalia, recently commented on the dubious
achievements of America's military venture:
We somehow managed to elevate Aidid, Morgan and Jess [leaders of the country's
three dominant clans] from the level of criminals to the level of statesmen. We're
dealing with a group of gangsters, if you want; the bottom line is that they're thugs.
It's comparable to taking gang leaders in L.A. and Chicago and making them
Congressmen. It wouldn't surprise me if you had total anarchy here before
Christmas. 78
Indeed, as General Aidid once again begins his grab for power and relief supplies continue
to dwindle, the frantic zero sum struggle for survival will likely send Somalia back into its
previous downward spiral into starvation and anarchy.
F. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE OBJECTIVE-LENS
The objectives which motivate violent communal conflicts generally differ,
significantly, from those upon which the majority of the world's instrumental wars of
politics are based. Since the latter class of conflict comprises the sum total of the wars in
America's experience, policy makers must move beyond the existing paradigms for
77See Donatella Lorch, "As U.S. Exits, Somali Clan Chief Stands Strong," New York
Times 2 Mar. 1994, nat'I. ed.: A4.
78See Donatella Lorch, "American Troops Count Hours to End of Mission in Somalia,
New York Times 28 Feb. 1994, nat'I. ed.: A3.
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analysis when seeking to identify the underlying causes of the world's present intra-state
communal conflicts. Most frequently, these conflicts are characterized by the perception-
held strongly by at least one of the parties in contest—of the conflict as a zero sum struggle
for survival. At the very least, the objectives in question are perceived as indivisible, with
"winner-take-all" as the battle cry of each contestant. This reality yields policy
implications for mediation that differ significantly—indeed almost incomparably—from
those associated with instrumental competitions for limited, negotiable political ends.
The specific examples discussed in this chapter are but a few of many available cases
with which to illustrate the significance of zero sum objectives in violent communal
conflicts across the globe. One might well apply the "objective-lens" introduced here to
the Armenian-Azerbaijani struggle in Nagorno-Karabakh, to the inter-tribal warfare in
Afghanistan, to the ongoing Hindu-Muslim battles in India's Kashmir and Bombay regions,
or to the communal savagery in Liberia, the Caucasus, and Sri Lanka, to no less effect.
The fundamental realization which such analysis yields is that the motives driving violent
communal conflicts are predominantly zero sum in nature, indivisible objectives perceived
to relate directly to the physical and/or cultural survival ofthe groups in question.
Perhaps the most serious problem posed by zero sum objectives is that they are
coming to characterize more, not less, of the world's conflicts. Because land and other
natural resources are declining and the world's population is growing, zero sum conflict
promises to be a growth industry well into the next century. As Robert Kaplan recently
observed, "In addition to engendering tribal strife, scarcer resources will place a great
strain on many peoples who never had much of a democratic or institutional tradition to
begin with. Over the next fifty years the earth's population will soar from 5.5 billion to
more than nine billion." He concludes that "the developing world environmental stress
will present people with a choice that is increasingly among: totalitarianism (as in Iraq),
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fascist-tending mini-states (as is Serb-held Bosnia), and road-warrior cultures (as in
Somalia)."79
As a final point, no analysis of the perceived objectives in a given conflict would be
complete without having previously addressed the role of socially constructed reality as
the foundation upon which group perceptions are themselves built. As demonstrated in
Chapter II, an external observer's interpretation of the objectives at stake in a given
conflict, will likely differ greatly from those held by the contestants within it. Even within
the same conflict, objectives may be regarded quite differently between the combatants.
For the Iraqi government to claim, for instance, that its diversion of the Tigris River is
intended merely to reclaim lost wetlands in a neighboring region [as, indeed, it has] is of
little importance to the Shiites, who are certain beyond the slightest doubt that the
measure is specifically designed to kill them. The most important lesson to recall when
peering through the objective-lens is not how we—the outside world—regard the objectives
in communal conflict, but rather what they—the combatants within it—perceive the stakes
to be.
79This extremely bleak, but provoking assessment characterizes the future for much of the
world as a pending struggle for survival. See Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy,"
Atlantic Monthly, vol. 273, no. 2 (Feb. 1994): 59.
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IV. THE FORCE STRUCTURE-LENS
As discussed in the preceding chapters, communal conflict manifests several unique
characteristics which, in combination, account for its exceptionally violent, intractable
nature as well as the strong tendency to escalate toward "total war." This chapter focuses
on the last of the three characteristics, examining the role of incoherentforce structure as
a major catalyst to escalation and a guarantor of intractability in communal conflicts.
Partly because of the ready historical "resource pools" and emotion laden issues,
communal disputes are prone toward violent escalation. One reason for this, as explained
earlier, is that the objectives tend to be perceived as inextricably linked to cultural survival,
if not to the immediate physical survival of the nation. Communal conflicts resemble
neither expressions ofmundane political wrangling between trade blocks, nor competitions
for ideological/geopolitical influence abroad. They are, ostensibly, rooted in deeper stuff-
defense of homeland, preservation of history, salvation of posterity—issues that touch the
most sensitive nerves of individual and group identity.
When such roots are combined with historically perpetuated prejudice and politically
activated inter-group antagonisms, the volatile tinder of human passion seemingly begs for
ignition. Indiscriminate violence, whose emergence under incoherent force structures is
almost inevitable, often serves as the match which lights the fires of escalation.
A. COHERENT VERSUS INCOHERENT FORCE STRUCTURE
The term coherentforce is used here to represent a civil-military structure in which
the government, military, and populace of a warring party act in approximate concert. 80
80Some of the ideas within this section build upon the concept of Trinitarian Warfare as
discussed by Martin Van Creveld in his provocative critique of Clausewitzian doctrine
entitled The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991.)
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This notion implies that a belligerent's forces under arms manifest a modicum of
coordination, a common purpose, and a roughly coherent chain of command. In such a
force, operational units are bound by constraints imposed by higher authority, with
objectives articulated and means assigned to achieve them. Within such a framework
there exists a confluence of strategy and action flowing downward from the supreme
command authority to soldiers in the field. A government manifesting such a civil-military
structure may be considered, in short, a coherent actor.
Incoherent force, by contrast, represents a structure in which a government's
command authority and its armed forces are disconnected from one another for want of a
functioning chain of command. 81 Such a situation essentially describes a state in which the
objectives of government, military and populace are uncoordinated, with each entity acting
independently of the others as its local leader deems fit. Incoherent force structures are
endemic in violent communal conflict, especially in untempered inter-ethnic militia
warfare.
Incoherent force structure is the essential precondition for fragmented military and
paramilitary violence which emerges quickly and builds rapidly in communal
conflagrations and, once present, changes fundamentally the complexion of the conflict
and the prognosis for resolution.
B. THE CONFLICT MATRIX
By combining two of the defining criteria introduced thus far—the zero sum/non-
zero sum objectives in conflict and coherent/incoherent force structure—a. useful matrix
81The phrase "armed forces" will refer throughout this chapter to the various groups
within a given communal conflict which, literally, possess and employ weaponry and
violence in the course of their intra-communal activities. The term may also apply, but is
not limited solely, to those coherent "national military forces" resembling the United States
Armed Forces. Here it will primarily refer to "those with the guns."
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emerges with which to simplify and categorize four fundamentally distinct potential
configurations of communal conflict. These analytic distinctions help to illuminate basic,
yet essential differences between conflicts from which then to proceed with further
investigation. As indicated in Figure 1, the dimensions of violent conflict may be
characterized as: (A) non-zero sum with coherent force structure; (B) non-zero sum with
incoherent force structure; (C) zero sum with coherent force structure; and (D) zero sum
with incoherent force structure. The ability of external powers to precipitate an end to








Figure 1: The Conflict Matrix
Each of the aforementioned combinations represents a unique picture of violent conflict.
Placing a given war into one of the four categories moves the analyst a large step forward
in the process of comprehending its unique dynamics and toward deducing a set of policy
prescriptions for mediation that flow from such understanding.
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C. CAUSE, PROCESS, AND EFFECTS OF INCOHERENT FORCE
A comprehensive understanding of incoherent force is important not only because it
is a potential catalyst in existing conflicts, but perhaps more importantly, because the onset
of paramilitary violence provides a major warning sign in the life cycle of any nascent
ethnic or religious dispute. 82 Indeed, the onset of paramilitary violence may be the final
opportunity for proactive mediation on the part of external powers.
For the sake of simplification, it is best to disaggregate the main components of
incoherent force and view them as a series of mutually reinforcing vectors, each pulling in
the direction of escalation. This task may be accomplished by examining the cause,
process, and results of incoherent force structure, as well some of the pernicious side
effects that tend to accompany civil-military fragmentation.
1. Cause: Political Manipulation of Communal Passion
Although several factors may contribute to the fragmentation of a
government's martial forces, political manipulation of group insecurity is by far the most
powerful. Ethnic, religious or sub-ethnic cleavages often lie relatively dormant for long
spans of time, the "ancient antagonisms" between communal groups set aside in favor of
peaceable rural citizenship and fruitful communal lifestyle. Once seized upon by ruthless
82The term paramilitary will be used somewhat loosely throughout this chapter to describe
an armed group of individuals—former or current military personnel, civilians, reserve
militiamen, or any combination thereof—which operates independently of a conventional
chain of command emanating from either an official state police apparatus or military
organization. It will be used interchangeably with the term militia, to connote regional
and sub-regional security collectives composed of aimed individuals residing in the local
areas.
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political pragmatists seeking personal power, however, long dormant divisions may be
manipulated in such a way as to unleash inter-group hatred ofunbridled ferocity. 83
The current global landscape of political violence is littered with the corpses of
clansmen that answered the calls of wily communicators who entertained ideas of personal
grandeur. Among the current examples of politically inspired hatred is the wreckage of
Bosnia, a republic of the former Yugoslavia, that until recently enjoyed proud billing as the
multicultural model for the world. The strategies of Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan
Kardazic, Mate Boban and the rest of Yugoslavia's ardent "nationalist" politicians involved
the manipulation of communal insecurities to maintain tentative positions of local authority
and political power. 84 By encouraging a fragmentation of armed force from the "national"
military force of Bosnia into sub-national ethnic militias composed of Croats, Serbs and
Muslims respectively, each of the regions' factional leaders endeavored to secure their own
positions vis-'a-vis the competition.
A question that quickly arises, however, is how this thorough fragmentation
was accomplished in such a short period of time, and why individual Bosnians—civilians
and soldiers alike—so quickly rushed to join a side in the bloody brawl.
83The manipulation of latent ethnic identity as a tool to reconstruct reality for political
gain is one of the concepts explored extensively by Cynthia Enloe in Ethnic Soldiers
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980). Regarding even long-dormant communal
divisions, Enloe writes "The outside observer should not mistake low saliency for the
disappearance of ethnic consciousness altogether. The unmobilized ethnic group is an
ethnic group in hibernation. If conditions pose opportunities or threats for which ethnic
ties are germane, ethnicity may once again take on vitality and political significance"
(Emphasis added, 6.)
84This is among the key themes emphasized repeatedly by Misha Glenny throughout his
book The Fall.
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a, "Reduction ofEnemies" Principle
The answer to this enormously important question may be found in a
phenomenon—common to all communal conflicts—which might be called the reduction of
enemies principle . This concept represents the choice that individuals residing within an
area of nascent communal strife are quickly forced to make once politicians begin to
manipulate ethnic or religious tensions for political gain. As inter-group prejudices are
increasingly fostered by vigorous publicity campaigns and political propaganda, latent
mistrust becomes reactivated among members of each of the various ethnic factions.
Under such circumstances, there is a natural tendency—perhaps a self-defense mechanism
rooted deep in human nature—to seek security amongst those who define themselves as
being "alike," that is, to group. Politicians seeking to increase power prey upon this
human instinct, loading blame for all of life's evils upon members of the other groups, the
"them" groups that have caused eternal problems for the "us" group with whom the
politician hopes to affiliate support. 85 With politicians from each side working
simultaneously to sequester their constituencies into psychological security collectives, the
society assumes a fragmentary dynamic. This dynamic causes the once heterogeneous
social body to become increasingly polarized, each sect drawing inexorably away from the
"others" with whom it once peacefully coexisted.
As polarization ensues, the institutional mechanisms for maintaining
order and justice begin to disintegrate. This happens because institutions, being ultimately
85Perhaps the most significant contribution to my understanding of the basic dynamics of
individual and group identity have come from Harold Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975). Amongst a great many other crucial
concepts relating to communal conflict, Isaacs discusses the elemental significance of the
"us" versus "them" dichotomy in providing the basic grounding upon which all identity
based disputes are predicated. See also, Walker Connor, "The Politics of
Ethnonationalism," Journal ofInternational Affairs, No. 1 (1973): 3.
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composed of individuals, themselves become casualties of the accelerating social
fragmentation. Members of local governments, regional military detachments, police
forces, even the media, begin to withdraw toward their own individual communal security
nets. A policeman, for instance, may become less willing to arrest or investigate members
of his own ethnic group accused of perpetrating crimes against the opposing group within
an increasingly polarized community. 86 He may not only feel a newfound obligation to
protect fellow clansmen, but may also distrust charges pressed by members of a group that
becomes daily more suspect in his own mind and in the minds of those around him.
Ironically, such defensive actions serve merely to reinforce the convictions entertained by
the other group that the local police forces are corrupt collaborators in a creeping
conspiracy of communal domination. These convictions feed the plaintiffs sense of
insecurity, thereby driving him farther toward his own group as the only source of reliable
protection available.
The spilling of blood marks a watershed on the timeline of any conflict.
In communal conflict, however, violence—particularly of an indiscriminate variety-
represents an escalation dynamic of herculean proportion. What might previously have
appeared as a gradual process of societal polarization now accelerates rapidly. At this
point, the Reduction of Enemies principle becomes clearly manifest. Enlightened
individuals who, prior to the outbreak of violence, aismissed "nationalist" rhetoric as mere
political propaganda may feel obligated to reevaluate their positions for the safety of their
86The Israeli-Palestinian situation in Hebron is a classic example of such ethnic bias. The
border police commander in Hebron recently admitted to an Israeli inquiry commission
that "...all Israeli forces in the area have standing orders never to fire at Jewish settlers,
even if the Jews are shooting at people." Instead, they are instructed to take cover and
wait for a chance to overpower the settlers. See Joel Greenberg, "Hebron Police Chief
Says Troops Cannot Shoot Jews, Even Killers," New York Times, 11 Mar. 1994, nat'l. ed.:
A1+.
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families. Those advocating the preservation of a multicultural society soon find
themselves isolated between warring camps, with enemies set against them on all sides.
Such a dilemma has clearly been the case with the urban "Bosnians" of
Sarajevo and other metropolitan areas of the former Yugoslavia. As the conflict there
expanded, those supporting the preservation of a multicultural Bosnia found themselves
confronted by three sets of enemies: Serbs, Croats and Muslims, all residents of the former
Republic of Bosnia, each now declaring blood oaths against the others. As inter-ethnic
violence escalated, each member of the ever decreasing pool of multicultural "Bosnians"
faced a painful decision: stand unarmed against three enemies and likely die, or abandon
the foundering principle of "nationhood" and join their own militarized ethnic group,
thereby reducing the number of enemy camps to two and significantly increasing their
chances for survival. With stakes so high, most people—like the majority of once
dedicated multicultural "Bosnians"~choose the latter option. The Reduction of Enemies
principle thus becomes reality, and represents a powerful catalyst to national
disintegration.
2. Process: The Fragmentation to Militia Warfare
As institutionalized mechanisms of security fail to stem the rising tide of
intermittent violence, a growing sense of individual impotence spreads throughout the
community. This creates a feeling of creeping vulnerability, one that cuts across lines of
class and culture, digging into the hearts of even the region's most sensible citizens. It is
this mood of widespread impotence and grass-roots desperation that local political leaders
seize as justification for the establishment of local paramilitary militias, ostensibly created
to defend the homes and families of their communal constituents. Coincidentally, these
political leaders become firmly entrenched as paramilitary chieftains of the nascent local
militia forces as well.
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a. Exploiting Impotence
Under a growing, demonstrably real threat, those individuals still
outside the pale of security are forced to scurry for the cover of group protection. As
communal security groups begin to coalesce, feelings of individual impotence lessen thus
providing their beleaguered members with a newfound sense of empowerment and relief.
Paradoxically, the move toward provincial security force organization provides an
additional asset, one that represents a great leap forward along the path of escalation:
offensive capability. Many people, grown weary of living "under siege," become receptive
to the calls for retribution made by local leaders who sense opportunity at hand.
Emboldened by militia forces at their disposal, local politicians embark on aggressive
campaigns waged against neighboring communal groups. Such campaigns may pursue
provincial objectives by unsavory means andproceed largely detachedfrom any greater
strategy waged by higher national authority.
A brief scan across the world's current ethnic and religious conflicts
reveals the near universal presence of militia warfare as a common denominator. Certainly
the unmitigated violence in Bosnia has been driven, in large measure, by inter-militia
atrocities—each attack by one clan eliciting a still more brutal response by another. 87
Examples are equally visible in the recent pogroms perpetrated upon Muslim populations
by Hindu paramilitaries in Kashmir, upon Hindu civilians by Sikh terrorists in Punjab, and
in the unending battles between Christian, Muslim, and Hindu militias elsewhere across
India's landscape. 88 Ravenous inter-ethnic militia warfare has long been an enduring
87For but one of innumerable articles detailing the early inter-militia atrocities in the
Yugoslav conflict, see Robin Knight, "Hostages to a brutal past," U.S. News & World
Report, 15 Feb. 1993:56-61.
88For a vivid account of the random violence in Kashmir, see Edward A. Gargan, "Indian
Troops Blamed As Kashmir Violence Rises," New York Times, 18 April 1993, nat'l. ed.:
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characteristic of the sub-continent's stark social cleavages. Similarly, paramilitary group
violence has remained a festering communal wound throughout the West Bank, Gaza
Strip and Golan Heights, where Israeli and Palestinian settlers have skirmished continually
for decades. Even now, before the most promising opportunity for peace in the history of
that conflict, talks may fail because they are disrupted daily by indiscriminate violence
waged by opposing paramilitary militias upon civilians of each side. 89
The fragmentation to incoherent militia warfare generally results from a
widespread sense of insecurity and impotence across the communal spectrum that is deftly
transformed to a tool for political gain. This gain may be sought by local leaders
endeavoring to reinforce or broaden their positions of power; by leaders at the national
level seeking to conquer the country's other factional power holder(s) by proxy in the
villages; or the conflict even may be international in scope, that is, a battle between states
in which one or both opposing governments choose to manipulate communal cleavages as
a strategy of warfare. Bosnia provides an example in which violent political struggles at
all three levels—local, regional and international—are clearly evident.
Serbia's role as covert proctor of communal warfare in Bosnia and
Croatia, by contrast, illustrates the international component of incoherent force. In an
effort to expand Serbia's geographical holdings, President Slobodan Milosevic has
manipulated long-standing anxieties of Serbs residing in the other Balkan republics and
provided moral and material support to local Serb paramilitary units advocating
A10+. My understanding of the fragmented, incoherent nature of political terrorism in
India was significantly broadened by Paul Wallace's essay, "Political Violence & Terrorism
In India: The Crisis Of Identity," in Terrorism In Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw
(University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ., 1994 forthcoming)..
89The political volatility of the incoherent violence along Israel's West Bank is well
illustrated in a recent report by Joel Greenberg, "After Palestinians Kill Israeli, Settlers'
Response Is Violent," New York Times, 2 Dec. 1993, nat'l. ed.: A8.
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secession. 90 His aspirations to create a territorially contiguous "Greater Serbia" have
nearly been achieved with but minimal actual involvement of Serbian forces.
Regardless of the level at which political gain is expected, an essential
truth of communal conflict is that individual insecurity and group identity vary in direct
proportion to one another. The more vulnerable one feels about being isolated, the
stronger his desire to identify with a group becomes. 91 Violence, more than any other
factor, reinforces this instinct. Ultimately, frightened citizens are forced to seek the
physical security for their homes and families that only local political strongmen, and the
armed militias they lead, can provide. Once begun, the polarization spreads rapidly. From
family to family, group to group, village to city, region to state, the contested country
becomes quickly atomized into a Hobbesian world in which local militia leaders rein
supreme, operating by their own means in pursuit of their own objectives. It is under such
conditions that one of the core qualities of all communal conflict—historically propagated
misperception—blooms to full vigor.
3. Effects: Reinforcement of Stereotypes
One need not trace the process of an ethnic or religious conflict far to discover
that individual prejudice and intergroup stereotypes play enormously important roles.
90A thorough account of the political strategies of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic
during his rise to power is provided by Aleska Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993): 81-96. Specifically regarding Milosevic's
great talent for manipulating communal insecurities, Djilas writes, "Milosevic seems to
have allied himself permanently with the politics of fear. He th"""es on it and is always on
the lookout for the hostility and conflict that produce it. This i * ">" nf the deeper causes
of the Yugoslav civil war: Milosevic counted on war, the ultinu ..edition offear, to
unite Serbs around him." (Emphasis added, 88.)
91 See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993). "In these cases, what binds a group together, separates it from others, and fatefully
leads it into action is not just (and perhaps not at all) language, or religion, or skin color,
but also a sense of common vulnerability...Security is thus one major key to identity."
(Emphasis added, x.)
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They facilitate psychological and moral disengagement which prepares the communal
battleground for atrocities of all kinds.
Indeed, as discussed in Chapter II, communal conflict is constructed upon a
firm foundation of misperceptions, myths, and negative stereotypes, joined together as
objectified reality. This psychological foundation is essential in allowing otherwise
rational human beings to thoroughly vilify members of competing groups. The vilification
of communal "enemies" is accomplished so comprehensively that the average citizen feels
justified in perpetrating heinous brutalities against them. 92 For a variety of reasons,
incoherent force is a major facilitator both in this process, and in the perpetuation and
propagation of prejudicial stereotypes.
In an environment where force structure is incoherent, violence and myth enjoy
a powerful synergism, one feeding upon the other. Local militias operate largely
unconstrained. Rules of engagement seldom apply where unsupervised paramilitary units
are concerned. Hence—depending upon the mind set of regional or local military leaders-
tactics may or may not coincide with the broadly understood and accepted international
rules ofwar as outlined by the Geneva Conventions. Adherence to such norms frequently
varies, even between different militias of the same communal group. There exists wide
tactical divergence, for instance, among the local Serb militias in Bosnia; in Croatia; and
between the regional Serb militias of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. The same may be said
of each of the other ethnic factions in the Balkan conflict. It is essential for policy makers
to realize that incoherent force structures breed tactical inconsistency , irrespective of the
banner beneath which the force elements fight.
92I refer once again to Albert Bandura's excellent discussion of the mechanisms by which
psychological self-restraints on individual and group conduct are removed, thereby
facilitating inhumane behavior, in Reich, 161-191. As Bandura observes, "Self-regulatory
mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated, and there are many psychological
processes by which moral reactions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct." (161.)
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Almost inevitably, in a military environment absent close supervision, frequent
atrocities occur. Atavistic behavior by one side becomes justification for the same on the
part of the other. Stories of such digressions of humanity are touted as proof of the
enemy population's barbarism, and quickly integrated into preexisting stereotypes of the
other groups as sub-human monsters. In a recent edition of World Press Review,
journalist Geert Mak offers an observation on the current ethnic bloodshed in Nagorno-
Karabakh, the embattled Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, that well might be applied
across a broad swath of communal conflicts. "What drives Armenia," writes Mak, "is, as
is so often the case, not a lust for conquest but wild fear." Discussing his recent trip to the
beleaguered enclave, Mak continues "One evening we went to an apartment full of
Armenian refugees from Baku and other parts of Azerbaijan. The room filled with
visitors, all of them telling of the Azerbaijani pogroms and the death squads that roamed
Sumgait and Baku in February, 1988. An old woman tells how, when she went out to buy
bread, she was assaulted by young men who rubbed out cigarettes in her face."93
Politicians, reporters, academics and other social propagandists find it much easier to vilify
the enemy when furnished with reports, such as this, of brutalities committed seemingly at
random. Indeed, the indiscriminate nature of paramilitary violence is among the most
terrifying aspects of communal warfare. It is a powerful influence in perpetuating
stereotypes and reinforcing zero sum perceptions of conflict.
a. A Case Study: Incoherent Force and Atrocity in the Sudan
The long running conflict in Sudan provides a still more graphic
illustration of the extent to which incoherent force and concomitant inter-ethnic militia
93See Geert Mak, "War and Fear Bring Isolation to Armenia," World Press Review, Vol.
40, No. 10 (October 1993): 11.
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violence might reinforce zero sum perceptions so completely as to remove all hopes of
resolution. In the latest decade-long chapter of the Sudanese civil war, the Islamic Arab
government in Khartoum has waged a brutal, albeit unsuccessful, campaign intended to
crush the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the main resistance force in the
south. This case is significant despite Khartoum's ultimate inability to eliminate the rebels,
because the government's otherwise ineffective efforts have been significantly enhanced by
the tactic of promoting an incoherent force structure and fostering inter-ethnic militia
warfare throughout the south. This tactic has been a strategic boon to the northern Arab
government and, simultaneously, a humanitarian disaster for the tribes of the southern
Sudan.
The Khartoum government, under the leadership of General Omar
Bashir, has extensively manipulated ethnic animosity between the southern tribes in its
efforts to eradicate the Dinka, the SPLA's dominant tribe and its greatest source of
support. Bashir has strategically armed and employed Arab tribes, traditional enemies of
the Dinka, creating wandering militias of vigilantes with automatic weapons. The
proliferation ofweapons imported from China and Iran and the complete lack of restraints
on the militias' methods have transformed ancient tribal clashes over grazing lands into
wars of extinction. 94
The Dinka, with a population of roughly 2 million, are the largest single
group in the Bahr El Ghazal region of southern Sudan. The region's capital city of Wau
provides the logistical center for Dinka military and economic activities. Stories of
government backed inter-tribal brutality in this region, bordering on outright ethnic
genocide, are legion. Cultural Survival Quarterly chronicled a series of such attacks
during a six month period in 1988:
94See Raymond Bonner, "Letter From Sudan," New Yorker, July 13, 1992, 74.
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March: Police near Ed Da'ein in Southern Darfur round up displaced Dinka "for
protection" into railway carriages. Local army-backed Fertit militia (joined by police)
kill up to 1,000 people and the rail carriages are doused in petrol and burned.
Government later admitted 100 people died. Local people in and around Wau report
that daily murders have been taking place for months.
June 20: Eighteen Dinkas found dead in Lokoloko area near Wau, with mutilated
bodies, no heads, no genitals and a pregnant woman with a cut abdomen.
July 18: Group of Dinkas found dead in Lokoloko, again with mutilated bodies and
one girl aged six or seven pierced by spear from vagina to mouth.
August 11: Responding to a "missile attack," Maj. Gen. Abu Gurun personally
supervises Fertit militiamen's search of Wau area, inhabited by poor Dinka. All
people without identification are shot and many houses are burned or looted. Total
killed is unknown, but police report finding 89 bodies. Hundreds are brought to
riverside by lorry and machine-gunned and dumped in river. Dinka boys, aged six to
10, are forced to kill their families with spears. Army puts 62 people in empty
ammunition storeroom and gasses them to death with exhaust pipe connected from
armored personnel carrier (witnesses report "red-lipped corpses," indicating carbon
monoxide poisoning). Partial lists of missing or killed total 1,132. Gen. Gurun claims
three "terrorists" killed.
Late August: Many Dinka children killed by Fertit militia. Fertit wife of a Jur
(southern) man killed by Fertit militia—her eyes are put out, breasts cut off and then
she is hanged. Lower ranks of the police (mainly Dinkas) form death squads [in
response] to kill Fertits.95
This partial listing of atrocities—whether objectively true or not—not only indicates the
potential level of barbarity which the Sudanese conflict had reached by 1988, but also
provides superb material for furthering the social construction of a zero sum reality.
As with many other cases of inter-ethnic militia warfare, the bloodshed
in Sudan shows no regard whatsoever for non-combatant distinctions. Instead of
reserving the violence for SPLA soldiers, the Arab militias have often turned against
civilians, killing the men and attacking women and children to avenge old hatreds. The
random attacks by rival tribal militias in Sudan often resemble the struggle in Yugoslavia,
95
"Sudan's Secret Slaughter," 44.
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where renegade paramilitary units have wreaked similar havoc upon civilian populations
caught in the middle.
The government in Khartoum has repeatedly revealed a proclivity to
manipulate the indigenous inter-ethnic rivalries to augment its counterinsurgent efforts. In
northern Equatoria, for instance, the Mundari tribe was implemented in 1991 by the
military as a buffer force around the main town of Juba against the advancing SPLA
forces. In Bahr al Ghazal and Southern Darfur, the Fertit tribe—a traditional enemy of the
Dinka~has used its essentially autonomous militia forces to extract material and financial
profit from the chaos. 96 It remains active in stealing the principle asset of the neighboring
Dinka tribe, cattle, as well as waging war against Dinka settlements. In the Upper Nile
region, the Nuer—also traditional enemies of the Dinka—were encouraged to harass the
SPLA around the town of Malakal.97 This conflict was particularly significant because of
the internal strife it evoked within the SPLA itself, which until that time enjoyed
significant—albeit potentially volatile—Nuer membership within the movement.
Signs of Khartoum's strategic success came in August 1991, when the
SPLA underwent a major split into two opposing factions. The mainstream faction
continues to be led by John Garang, and includes the larger Dinka membership. The
breakaway faction, known as the Nasir group, consists of the Nuer and other non-Dinka
minorities formerly included within the SPLA. The Nasir group is led by Riek Mashar, a
Nuer tribesman, and includes numerous other former senior SPLA commanders. 98 The
SPLA forces have subsequently engaged in bitter fratricidal warfare in which an estimated
96
"Sudan's Secret Slaughter," Cultural Survival Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1988): 42.
97Ibid.
98See Samuel Makinda, "Security in the Horn of Africa," Adelphi Paper, No. 269
(Summer 1992): 46.
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2,000 rebel soldiers have been killed by their former comrades." This has significantly
weakened the SPLA's movement vis-'a-vis the government forces. 100
Despite Khartoum's initial impressions of success, its choice to
encourage inter-ethnic militia warfare in the south seems to have backfired in the long run.
Under such circumstances, the Dinka people could assume with substantial certainty that
they were, indeed, engaged in a battle for survival—zero sum conflict in its purest sense.
With the government directly sponsoring the enemy Fertit tribe, even truly non-aligned
Dinka civilians had nowhere to turn but to the SPLA for protection.
Attacks such as those chronicled above exert enormous influence on
inter-group perceptions and individual stereotypes. Facing such indiscriminate brutality, a
group's collective will to resist becomes nearly unbreakable, and the means of defense
which its members regard as justified become virtually unlimited. For these reasons, any
conflict in which incoherent force structure either already exists or is actively encouraged
is likely to be characterized by lawlessness and atrocity, and be highly resistant to external
efforts at mediation.
4. Coincident Effects: The Thug Factor
A final characteristic of conflicts executed under incoherent force structures is
that of the rise of common outlaws to positions of leadership amongst the paramilitary
forces. This development often results in groups on each side pursuing criminal agendas
under the justification of regional security, and plundering the persons and property of
innocent civilians as supposed "retribution" for previous attacks by opposing militias.
"See Chris Hedges, "Sudan's Strife Promises to Outlive Rebellion," New York Times, 19
July 1992, nat*led.:E3.
100A full account of strategic and political developments subsequent to the split is provided
by Mark Huband, "While The People Starve," Africa Report, May-June, 1993: 36.
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Frequently, local criminal violence is the direct product of preexisting animosity; that is, it
is perpetrated upon victims whom the attackers have long known and resented.
A senior intelligence officer of the Central Intelligence Agency recently stated,
"the evidence coming out of these places overwhelmingly confirms that there is a heavy
influence ofpersonality in this type of (communal) violence—that is to say, the hatred is
personal" 101 Speaking specifically in regard to the atrocities occurring in Bosnia, he cited
the basic presence of class warfare as a significant factor, "it's sort of a case of wealthy
Muslim haves being hit by the have not's who are anxious to get even." 102 This
phenomenon has the undesirable effect of reinforcing inter-group stereotypes and
spawning an environment of lawlessness which must be first removed—a difficult task-
before efforts at resolution have even the most remote chances of success.
The thug factor is a toxic byproduct of the incoherent force equation, one
which simultaneously increases the intensity of a conflict while decreasing the ability of
outside actors to control if. It works in two important ways. First, the presence of
criminals in local militia hierarchies accentuates inter-group stereotypes and reinforces the
resolve of each side to resist the other. Second, granting legitimacy to former outlaws
encourages them to continue fighting, thereby increasing the difficulty of bringing the
armed parties to the bargaining table. This development effectively halts mediators in their
tracks for, as has been proven many times in the past, efforts at conflict resolution minus
the cooperation of all belligerents are likely doomed to failure. 103
101Much of this section is based on information obtained during an interview with a senior
intelligence officer working on war crimes in Bosnia for the Central Intelligence Agency.
The interview was conducted at the CIA, December 20, 1993, but because of his
continuing participation in covert intelligence operations in Bosnia, the subject commented
on a non-attribution basis.
102Ibid.
103For an extensive, empirical study of the various dynamics of war termination, see Paul
R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). This
work is particularly valuable in illustrating the severe limitations of the prevailing "Rational
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Communal conflicts as divergent as Somalia, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan
and Bosnia illustrate equally well how incoherent force provides the stage on which
common criminals rise to positions of social and military prominence. In these cases and
many others, former social outcasts have—largely with bullets and bravado—undergone the
strange transmogrification from hood to hero, emerging with newfound status they are not
prone to relinquish lightly. Having achieved the leadership and autonomous control of
local armed forces, these individuals frequently embark on campaigns of rape and pillage,
aggressively targeting communal opponents in order to even old scores and to increase
support amongst beleaguered contingents of their own ethnic or religious constituency.
Meanwhile these politico-gangsters remove potential competitors and amass personal
fortunes, thus cementing their positions as feudal warlords so long as war prevails. To
such men, resolution of conflict represents nothing but an inevitable loss of power and,
perhaps, criminal prosecution.
a. Arkan the Magnificent
No single individual exemplifies this position so dramatically as Serbia's
rogue celebre', Zeljko Raznatovic, the infamous Serb paramilitary chieftain best known by
the nickname "Arkan." Raznatovic is the leader of the much dreaded "Tiger" militia, a
well armed and aggressive paramilitary unit composed exclusively of ethnic Serb
militiamen who follow their leader with near fanatic zeal. From a group originally
comprising little more than an odd cabal of militant soccer fans, Arkan has—through an
odd marriage of charisma and terror—exploited the permissive environment of incoherent
Actor" paradigm for conflict resolution—that is, war termination as a rational bargaining
process—in the growing number of hostile environments characterized by incoherent
communal conflict.
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force in the former Yugoslavia to build a paramilitary organization of wide renown,
perhaps unsurpassed in the Balkans.
Zeljko Raznatovic's infamous resume is detailed in journalist John
Kifher's recent investigation for the New York Times. 104 Kifner writes, "wanted by
Interpol for murders, bank robberies and jailbreaks across Europe, he is the undisputed
kingpin of a black market and racketeering underworld and a warlord whose 'Tiger'
militias led the way in looting and slaughtering through Croatia as well as in Bosnia and
Herzegovina." Yet despite this dubious background, Arkan has emerged, in Kifher's
words, "as the newest political star in the Serbian firmament in his bid for a seat in
Parliament." A man whose exploits in robbery, rape and murder earned for him a
prominent position on then Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger's December 1992
list of outlaws that should face UN war crimes tribunals, Raznatovic now enjoys status as
a national celebrity. With the political weight of Serbian President Milosevic firmly behind
him, and the moral support of Serbs both at home and abroad, Arkan's strength is not
likely to fade soon.
It would be a grave mistake to discount the case of Arkan as a mere
aberration of nationalistic fanaticism, for, in Serbia as in each of the other former republics
of Yugoslavia—all arenas of incoherent militia warfare—Mr. Raznatovic is hardly alone.
As Kifner observes, "on all sides, the brutal fighting has brought to the fore former
underworld figures, among them, for example, Tuna Matilic, a commander of the Croatian
forces besieging Mostar, and Juka Prazina, a Muslim whose hijacking of a United Nations-
protected Yugoslav Army convoy in 1992 provided the weapons that made the initial
defense of Sarajevo possible. In addition, the war has spawned a vast criminal trade—in
104See John Kifner, "An Outlaw in the Balkans Is Basking in the Spotlight," New York
Times, 23 Nov. 1993, nat'l. ed.: Al.
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arms, drugs, and other smuggled goods—that often crosses religious and national lines." 105
The violent Yugoslav drama thus plays on, and will likely continue, choreographed by
larcenous directors intent upon postponing the denouement indefinitely.
b. Thugs in Belfast
Nor should we suppose that the Balkan war is itself unique as regards
the important role which the thug factor plays in perpetually fanning the flames of
communal conflict. In Northern Ireland, as in many other ostensibly "ethno-religious"
disputes manifesting incoherent force structures, the seldom discussed influence of graft
and corruption amongst the leadership of rival clans is hardly insignificant. The tendency
to overlook this component as an enduring motive for continued violence is among the
issues addressed in Scott Anderson's book entitled, War Zones: Voices From the World's
Killing Grounds. Although the ethnic and religious animus at work in Belfast certainly
ought not be minimized as the major cause of that region's long-running conflagration,
neither, as Anderson argues, should it be held so high as to eclipse all other factors.
Belfast represents yet another conflict in which an incoherent force
structure facilitated the rise of rival paramilitary godfathers pursuing criminal agendas
beneath banners of ethnic patriotism. In a recent article for the New York Times Anderson
writes, "...assigning the violence of Northern Ireland to religious hatreds or mere
senselessness is too easy. In fact, the militants have a very good reason for wanting to
sabotage any prospect of peace, one that has less to do with flags or gods and more to do
with money." 106 Anderson traces Northern Ireland's slide into "gangsterism" to the first
big influx of British development money in the early 1980s, funds which London hoped
105Ibid., A8.
106Scott Anderson, "The Price of Peace in Ulster," New York Times, 18 Jan. 1994, nat'l
ed.: A23.
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would help cool the hotbed of ethnic and religious passions. Unfortunately, as Anderson
writes, "given the high stakes, it wasn't long before the hard men advanced to the next
stage of crime syndication—collusion. The chieftains of the various factions, while still
publicly committed to one another's annihilation, came to a series of very private
understandings: recognition of one another's free-enterprise zones, joint administration of
the rackets, even 'integrated' crews of Loyalists and Republicans working side by side at
construction sites." 107 A cessation of hostilities and the British withdrawal sure to follow
would now mean an end to these warlords' well established collaborative crime syndicates
—Catholic and Protestant alike—as well as ending London's development funds, Northern
Ireland's most important source of external revenue. Under such circumstances, the
incentives for a negotiated peace amongst the factional kingpins are virtually non-existent.
c. Perspective
The aforementioned examples are intended merely to illustrate a few of
the serious complications that the introduction of a criminal agenda adds to the already
messy plate of communal conflict. Within the Hobbesian environment of incoherent force,
lawlessness thrives, quickly becoming a force with which would-be mediators must first
reckon before proceeding with negotiations of any significance. Finally, because of its
adverse effects on inter-group stereotypes and the additional problem of bringing disparate
warlords to a common bargaining table, the thugfactor represents a major obstacle to the
achievement of lasting peace in communal conflicts.
Hence it is clear that the various components of incoherent force,
exercised in combination, create an environment in which a negotiated cessation of
hostilities becomes, at best, problematic. Through the manipulation of communal
107Ibid.
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insecurities, local politicians begin a process of societal polarization that is completed by
the onset of bloodshed. The resulting fragmentation to militia warfare and inevitable
proliferation of random violence simultaneously enhances intergroup stereotypes,
exacerbates misperceptions and removes the formerly legitimate mechanisms for
restraining antisocial behavior. This demise of order creates an opening for criminality
that, once present, further polarizes opposing camps and decreases the potential for
cooperative negotiations toward peace.
5. Future Fertile Ground
As two final examples of the great potential for incoherent communal forces to
influence the course of global conflict, one should consider the current demographics of
the People's Republic of China and of the former Soviet Union. The P.R.C. presently
contains fifty-six so-called National Minority peoples, numbering some ninety million
persons and inhabiting more than sixty percent of its territories. 108 Similarly, Russia
currently has troops—military and paramilitary alike—loyal to it in every republic except
Azerbaijan, with some 25 million ethnic Russians residing in scattered patches "abroad."
Russians further account for more than 30 percent of the population in Estonia and 34
percent in Latvia. 109 In each of the former Soviet republics many of these Russian
citizens, once the local power holders, are today disenfranchised and beginning to organize
as Moscow fails to afford them security.
D. THE CHIEF PROSPECT OF INCOHERENT FORCE: ESCALATION
The rise of incoherent force structure brings with it, as its chief prospect, escalation.
The phenomenon compounds itself. First, the proliferation of incoherent force paralyzes
108Moynihan, 156.
109See John Lloyd, "New World Wars," World Press Review, Vol. 40, No. 10 (October
1993): 8.
84
the institutional mechanisms of order thereby removing internal controls on group conduct
and introducing what might be called the "runaway train" syndrome of degenerating
violence; second, incoherent force structure engenders a "war of existence" mentality in all
parties to the conflict, thereby justifying all future means of resistance and prosecution.
With rising fears and declining controls local militias are freed to determine the course of
conflict. Unfortunately, their violent campaigns of "survival of the fittest" are contests
which too frequently recognize neither international conventions for combatants, nor
immunity for civilians along the path to total war.
1. The "Runaway Train" Syndrome
As people become convinced that the once legitimate institutions of order have
failed, panic spreads. The conflict assumes a posture of increasing velocity and decreasing
control, much as a "runaway train" on a downward track. Latent misperceptions, revived
by sly politicians, lead to renewed distrust and outright fear of those outside the group.
Increased fear heightens tensions and decreases communication. Such tension gives way
to violence which, in turn, reinforces misperceptions and distrust, leading to yet greater
tension and further violence. The absence of institutional restraints ensures that early
violence will be followed by yet more violence, each episode decreasing the likelihood of
de-escalation as the cycle generates its own cruel inertia of motion.
2. Creating A "War for Existence"
As the "Runaway Train" gathers steam, an ideal environment is created in
which the myth of "war for existence" may be objectified—once and for all—as fact. The
frequent and random nature of inter-clan violence and atrocity serves to transform images
of the enemy that might once have been recognized as gross caricatures, into widely held
truths. Communal opponents no longer appear to each other as they are—as individuals
with hopes, dreams, and fears, composed ofhuman flesh and blood. Rather, they become
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as permanent psychological holograms of terror—etchings of all things bad and monstrous
—bent upon the inexorable destruction of one's own community. These images, once
secure in a group's collective psyche, are fundamentally incompatible with further
reasoning or compassion. The conflict henceforth transcends debates of "right versus
wrong," becoming instead revered as a fight for life. In such a fight, any and all means of
warfare become justified, regardless of consequence thereafter.
E. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIATION
In scanning the global spectrum of ethnic and religious disputes, one is hard pressed
to find a single conflict in which the role of incoherent force is not significant. Local
militias in townships of South Africa, Afghanistan, Angola, Sri Lanka, and Lebanon wreak
no less havoc than do their contemporaries, mentioned here, in Gaza, Kashmir, Nagorno-
Karabakh, Wau, Belfast, and Sarajevo. Yet, despite such evidence, strategies for
consolidating incoherent force structures are seldom addressed as essential to conflict
mediation.
The American, indeed, the Western way of diplomacy shows a distinct a preference
for rational, orderly negotiations. Satisfying this preference, however, requires selecting
political figureheads with whom to deal. This process too often overlooks the fact that
those individuals so chosen may speak for but limited factions of a given conflict. Any
bargain struck under such conditions will be ignored entirely by those not party to the
negotiations. Yet, for many of the reasons outlined earlier in this paper, bringing together
all parties of an incoherent conflict is difficult, if not impossible. Herein lies the mediator's
paradox in environments of incoherent force: to bargain with a quorum is hard—to
bargain without one is impossible. As the UN Under-Secretary-general For Peace-
Keeping Operations, Kofi Annan, recently observed, "The levers available to the UN in
86
conflicts between states are just not available in these situations. What worked in dealing
with states does not work against factions led by power-hungry men." 110
Hence, a proactive policy of intervention designed to preempt such disintegration of
a country's martial forces seems to offer the best opportunities for success. Owing to the
widely divergent circumstances of each individual case, it is not possible to identify
specific strategies of intervention suitable for all communal conflicts. It is far more useful
to discuss, in somewhat abstract terms, the notion of disarming the intergroup
misperceptions that underlie communal conflict. In so doing, one may hope to attack the
disease of communal hatred rather than merely treating its recurring symptoms.
F. CONCLUSION
Incoherent force structure is a key characteristic of violent intra-state ethnic or
religious conflict. Its appearance signals a dangerous transformation in the life cycle of
any communal dispute and often represents a major catalyst in the escalation toward total
war. The proliferation of armed militias constitutes a major obstacle to the negotiated
cessation of hostilities in such conflicts. Western mediators attempting to effect war
termination through a rational bargaining process will find little success in an environment
of incoherent force that lacks coherent actors, that is, two to three unified "governments"
which exercise de facto control over each of the warring sides. Hence strategies of
intervention should address the internal dynamics of incoherent force and seek to
proactively preempt , or, if not possible, to reactively undue such structures. Clearly, the
former may be accomplished far more easily than the latter.
The role of incoherent force in communal conflict is too seldom discussed and,
perhaps, too little understood by the American policy makers currently trying to make
110Bhaskar Menon, "A Dangerous Time For Peace-Keepers," World Press Review, Vol.
40, No. 10 (October 1993): 15.
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policy sense out of relatively minor ethnic and religious disputes around the world. Yet
with the growing specter of major communal conflagrations looming in Russia, Ukraine,
and China—nuclear powers all—now is the time for adept preventative diplomacy to assist
in building safeguards into the civil-military structures ofthese countries.
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The preceding discussion holds significant implications for officials attempting to
forge policy responses to the world's current and emerging communal conflagrations. The
conceptual-lenses provided in the earlier chapters—social construction, perceived
objectives, and force structure—each illuminate a different aspect of communal warfare
and, simultaneously, illustrate a number of theoretical variables which bear further
consideration in the future.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIATORS
This paper's sociological and structural analysis yields a number of significant
implications for policy makers contemplating mediation in foreign communal conflicts.
The force structure variable is perhaps of the most immediate significance to prospective
strategists of intervention. This is true because the incoherent structure of the forces
engaged in intra-state communal warfare requires a fundamentally different approach for
mediation than that appropriate for the implicitly coherent force structures manifest in
inter-state conflicts.
1. Force Structure Revisited
When seeking to influence an actor with a coherent force structure, such as
most of the world's sovereign states, the strategy of intervention flows from the top
downward. That is, to influence the behavior of the state as a whole, its government
provides the logical point of contact. An agreement with the political leadership of such
an actor will effect the agreed upon changes in the behavior of its forces.
When seeking to influence the disparate national actors in an incoherent force
structure, by contrast, the approach differs significantly. Because of the lack of collective
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leadership, a top downward strategy will not be effective. Rather, an approach from the
bottom upward designed to sever ties between local leaders and their constituents, offers
the most fruitful approach to mediation.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the different force structures
and corresponding approaches:
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Figure 2: Force Structure and Mediation
This model was developed in collaboration with Thesis Advisor Dana P. Eyre, December, 1993
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The basic strategy of intervention should thus vary according to which of the conceptual
representations a conflict most closely resembles. The variable of force structure is among
the most basic yet significant implications for policy makers to consider in communal
conflict.
2. Time And Other Intangibles
In addition to force structure there are other, perhaps less tangible implications
which are of no less significance to U.S. foreign policy efforts.
First, and perhaps most importantly, U.S. policy makers should rigorously
attempt to heed the Physician's Maxim: do no harm . Only thorough, well-reasoned
analysis—in advance of policy experimentation—offers a reasonable prognosis for achieving
this goal. Based upon Washington's recent record, it is clear that the existing framework
for such analysis is incomplete and should be reevaluated.
Second, U.S. policy makers should consider the potential effects of time in the
communal conflict equation. There is an important temporal aspect to the calculus of
escalation that characterizes these conflicts. A communal spat caught early in its life-cycle
will seldom have reached the heights of zero sum escalation that occur as time passes and
internecine violence grows.
In formulating responses to emerging conflicts, it is important to recognize that
the passage of time generally complicates rather than mitigates the complex internal
dynamics of communal conflicts. The characteristics discussed throughout this paper
enjoy a synergistic relationship which pulls inexorably toward violent escalation as time
elapses. Hence would-be peace makers must weigh the moderate expenses required for
timely, proactive mediation in nascent communal conflicts against the far greater cost in
"blood and treasure" that may be demanded for later intervention into an environment of
advanced communal warfare.
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a. The Paradox ofHumpty Dumpty
The trade-off between the costs of proactive and reactive mediation is,
perhaps, best illustrated by the well-known Paradox of Humpty Dumpty 1U The story
shows well the potential value of proactive mediation.
Although the story of Humpty Dumpty's great fall is an oft told fable,
few raconteurs stop to consider the chain of events leading up to the catastrophe. In all
likelihood, Humpty-Dumpty did not simply hop off the edge, but rather lost his balance
slowly. Being a round sort of fellow, his undulations and pleas for help would have
doubtless drawn the attention of at least some of the king's horses and men. Being
somewhat preoccupied with their own activities, however, the horses likely chose to
ignore his plight. Some of the men standing by must have wondered aloud that, surely, he
would steady himself. Perhaps others worried of becoming casualties to his fall should
they arrive at the base of the wall too late, and, so fearing, simply watched. A few
doubtless argued, vociferously, that it was not their affair and turned away, refusing to
look. There may even have been some cruel hearted cynics who shouted taunts that, were
he more svelte, he might extricate himself more easily from the precarious perch.
Thus, prior to Humpty Dumpty's great fall in the story, one easily
envisions a crowd of horses and men prevaricating as the hapless orb grew less stable. By
the time he toppled over backward, it was, in fact, too late. Poor Humpty Dumpty
fragmented into a hundred pieces or more, a mess which could never be reconstructed by
all the horses and men in the kingdom, despite their most sincere efforts and tireless
labors.
mThis useful, if comical, conceptual analogy was introduced to the author by Thesis
Advisor, Dana P. Eyre.
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This classic children's tale provides an obviously oversimplified but
useful analogy to the value of proactive mediation. And, lest it seem too frivolous an
example, one has but to look briefly upon the wreckage of Yugoslavia to see the wisdom
in the fable's admonition for courage, citizenship, and a bit of foresight.
B. THE OPTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
Policy makers gazing upon the global field of communal conflicts have essentially
two options. The first pertains to conflicts which have not yet exploded into full-scale
communal warfare. The second, by contrast, applies to more advanced conflagrations in
which widespread inter-group violence already exists.
In nascent communal conflicts, mediators must proactively seek to halt the
escalation toward zero sum communal competition and, simultaneously, derail the
fragmentation to an incoherent force structure. This option requires entree, incentives,
and a sociological strategy designed to disarm misperceptions and thereby deconstruct the
emerging reality of conflict. It may be accomplished with a minimum of force and a
surplus of diplomacy.
In advanced communal conflicts manifesting incoherent force structures and zero
sum perceptions of reality, however, mediation is considerably more difficult. The field of
actors must first be consolidated by a combination of incentives and force. De facto peace
having been imposed, intervening forces may then turn to the structural and sociological
strategies of organizing government and reconstructing society. This latter option is
essentially a process of undoing feudalism, an approach similar in concept to those which
successfully reunited the feudal societies ofEurope and Japan. 112
112The reunification process that ended feudalism in Japan and Europe offers significant
implications for intervention in violent communal conflicts. This approach to communal
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In either case, however, the variable of time is extremely important. It is essential
for U.S. analysts to recognize that, as time elapses and casualties mount, the internal
dynamic of escalation decreases the likelihood of successful mediation at an acceptable
cost. Even as the American public's will to intervene increases over time in relation to the
level of carnage in a given conflict, the prognosis for successful intervention worsens. At
some point, the low probability of success becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; that is, the
initially supportive public becomes unwilling to risk either its treasury or its soldiers on a
futile enterprise. The danger inherent in extensive prevarication and diplomatic










Figure 3: The Perils of Procrastination
conflict mediation, undoing feudalism, will provide the substantive grist of a pending
Ph.D. dissertation by the same name.
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Hence the variable relationship between time, escalation, and failure holds important
implications for the makers of American foreign policy and their advisors.
1. Disarming Misperceptions
The proactive mechanisms available to prospective international mediators
seeking to counter a country's slide toward incoherent force and escalation are essentially
two-fold.
The first, and perhaps most apparent, is to halt—or at least slow—the
polarization of its society. In this task, a sociological approach may prove the most useful.
Mediators must seek—prior to the widespread outbreak of violence—to steal fuel from the
engine of insecurity. Primarily through economic incentives and counter-propaganda
campaigns, local and regional leaders advocating politics of division must be isolated, their
strategies and motives clearly revealed as self-serving and dangerous. Government
policies must then be encouraged to address communal grievances and attempt to rectify
those inequitable conditions that most aggravate inter-group passions. 113
A second variation might be considered in situations where nascent communal
violence has begun to appear, but has not yet disintegrated to the point of full-scale inter-
militia warfare. This approach involves the nominal introduction of UN peace keepers
onto the soil of the troubled nation as a type of "referee force," thereby postponing further
escalation. Once in place, the previously mentioned process of isolating militant leaders
and removing intergroup misperceptions must be instituted quickly and continued
113The potentially volatile role of preferential policies—that is, those perceived to benefit
one communal group at the expense of another—in igniting intergroup passions is a key
theme explored by Donald Horowitz in Part Two of his path-breaking book on ethnicity in
international politics, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985): 95-290. In Part Five, Horowitz examines further the implications, risks and
possibilities of using preferential policies strategically to reduce ethnic conflict in divided
societies.
95
indefinitely. Such a process may be long, difficult, and not inexpensive, but may avoid a
later compulsion to involve peace keepers in outright hostilities against warring factions.
In either of these strategic variations of disarming misperceptions, incentives
must be accompanied by a coherent strategy of psychological operations intended to break
down existing animosities and remove fear. 114 Such a strategy entails both an active
counter-propaganda campaign aimed at the adult populations of the fragmented society
and an educational campaign to help resocialize subsequent generations of potential
combatants.
Clearly, few would disagree that a proactive strategy of maximizing influence
and minimizing force is the most appealing option. Yet reality intrudes quickly onto such
a pleasant scene, bringing with it some glaring questions: What of the missed
opportunities? What about those conflicts already characterized by social polarization,
force fragmentation and full-scale paramilitary violence? What may be done when there is,
quite literally, no peace to keep? The short and pragmatic answer is, not much, for it
becomes virtually impossible to disarm misperceptions in the midst of a fire-fight. War
having arrived, it may be that the unpleasant option of "invading the country to save it,"
remains the only feasible action besides inaction.
2. Undoing Feudalism
The central dilemma of extricating a country from the internecine warfare that
accompanies incoherent force structure and zero sum competition may be somewhat
simplistically described as a problem of "undoing feudalism." Achieving negotiated peace
involves bringing to the bargaining table a collection of newly empowered individuals who
114An excellent introduction to a comprehensive approach integrating economic incentives,
strategic propaganda, physical security, and reeducation is provided by the U.S. Army
Psychological Operations Manual, FM 33-1-1, Coordinating Draft, 1992.
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have little incentive to bargain. Any such resolution will likely require establishing
communication between and winning the cooperation of local militia leaders who,
entrenched in positions of power throughout the various regions, enjoy de facto status
akin to medieval lords.
Even if this enormous task is accomplished through various incentives, there
remains the challenge of controlling the militias during ongoing negotiations, and ensuring
their compliance with adopted resolutions. The challenge for mediators thus remains a
multivaried problem of establishing communication, cooperation, and control amidst
groups of individuals (who are functioning, essentially, as "extractive capitalists") and are
wholly dedicated to destroying one another. Couched in such terms, intervention seems a
futile task.
For many of the reasons mentioned above, the international community's
continuing efforts to halt bloodshed in the Balkans, for instance, are not likely to succeed
soon. In fact, as 1994 brought renewed UN sponsored negotiations to Bosnia,
representatives of each of the warring parties predicted early failure. All sides have
warned UN negotiators that the incoherent nature of the forces in and around Sarajevo
and elsewhere make it likely that—even as negotiations proceed—small skirmishes might
easily turn to major battles overnight. Largely because of this uncontrolled environment,
the mediators recently concluded, "the prospects for peace have never looked worse in the
entire 21 month long civil war." 115 Similar prognoses might be given for the chances of
peace in Israel, South Africa, Liberia, Somalia, and, indeed a number of the world's other
communal battlegrounds.
115See report by Bob Lozier, Cable News Network, 18 January 1994.
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C. CONCLUSIONS
This paper argues that modern intra-state communal warfare exhibits several unique
qualities that distinguish such conflicts, significantly, from the wars in America's historical
experience. It demonstrates that identifying the social constructions of reality is a central
task for analysts seeking to comprehend the characteristics that define communal conflict.
It explains that the objectives for which communal conflicts are waged are often perceived
as indivisible, zero sum contests in the most absolute sense and thus differ, fundamentally,
from those upon which many inter-state wars of politics are predicated. It illustrates the
pernicious but seldom discussed effects of incoherent force structure which provide both
the catalyst to escalation and an unavoidable obstacle to negotiations. It concludes that
the state-based, implicitly coherent, "rational actor" paradigm for international relations is
simply inadequate for the task of analyzing and describing communal conflicts which
manifest no such characteristics.
The paper proposes a two-fold conceptual strategy for mediation based upon the
extent to which a given conflict has escalated, and the level to which its internal force
structure has fragmented toward incoherence. The proactive strategy addresses conflicts
at an early stage and applies a sociological approach to disarm misperceptions and
deconstruct conflict. The reactive strategy requires a forcibly imposed cease-fire followed
by extensive sociological, economic, and psychological approaches toward undoing the
feudal structure of fragmented communal society.
Because of the important differences between intra-state communal conflicts and the
other Twentieth Century wars in which America has been involved, the dominant
paradigms upon which past foreign policy was based now must be reexamined to ensure
their applicability to modern realities. Americ;: i and allied policy makers are slowly
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realizing that distinct classes of conflict require equally distinct strategies of intervention if
foreign policy efforts are to succeed.
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